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A functionalist approach to cognition assumes that people’s minds are tuned to 
process and remember information that benefits our survival or reproduction 
(Nairne, 2005). One source of information with potentially high fitness value is 
things that are alive and animate (Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada, Cogdill, & 
LeBreton, 2013). The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the effects of 
using an ancient mnemonic – the method of loci – to examine memory for 
animate objects. Across four experiments, subjects used the method of loci to 
remember a list of animate or inanimate objects. I manipulated animacy by 
using animate or inanimate words (Experiments 1 and 4) or by using animate 
or inanimate images (Experiments 2, 3, and 4). In Experiment 1, memory for 
animate and inanimate words was tested in either the method of loci or a 
pleasantness ratings control condition. Subjects learned a list of words; half of 
the words were animate and the other half were inanimate. Subjects in both 
conditions recalled more animate than inanimate words. The animacy effect in 
the method of loci was smaller relative to the pleasantness condition. 
viii 
Experiments 2 and 3 were concerned with using imagery to manipulate 
animacy. In Experiment 2, all subjects were given a list of inanimate words. In 
the animate condition, subjects were told to imagine the object was alive 
whereas in the inanimate condition, subjects were given no explicit instructions 
concerning animacy. There was no animacy effect in this experiment. In 
Experiment 3, subjects saw inanimate words paired with experimenter-
generated descriptions of images, half of which were animate and half of which 
were inanimate. Subjects recalled more words that were paired with animate 
images than words that were paired with inanimate images, although this effect 
was not statistically significant.  
Experiment 4 used a combination of animate words and images to 
examine the animacy effect. I factorially crossed word type (animate vs. 
inanimate) with image type (animate vs. inanimate) to explore the effect of 
adding animate and inanimate images to inanimate and inanimate words. 
There were main effects of word type and image type such that animate words 
were recalled more than inanimate words (as in Experiment 1) and words 
associated with animate images were recalled more than words associated 
with inanimate images (as in Experiment 3). Overall, the results of these four 
experiments suggest that the animacy effects persist in the method of loci. 
These results contribute to a growing body of evidence that suggest that 











Adaptive Cognition and Memory 
A functionalist approach to cognition assumes that cognitive processes 
are tuned to solve adaptive problems that benefit survival or reproduction. 
Nature “selects” one physical design over another because that design has 
fitness value – it helps the organism solve an adaptive problem that in turn 
increases the chances that the organism will pass the genetic material down to 
the next generation. In biology the heart is uniquely designed to pump blood, 
and the kidneys to filter impurities. In the same way, it is likely that nature has 
shaped the design and function of our cognitive systems (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992). From this perspective it logically follows that our memory system, like 
our heart and lungs, is also “tuned” to remember things that enhance our 
fitness (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; Nairne, 2005; Nairne 2014; 
Sherry & Schacter, 1987). 
In a foundational paper concerned with adaptive memory, Nairne, 
Thompson, & Pandeirada (2007) offered a functional account of memory that 
suggested our ability to remember evolved to solve adaptive problems. That is, 
our memory systems are likely specifically tuned to process information that is 
relevant to survival. In a typical survival processing paradigm, originally 
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developed by Nairne et al. (2007), subjects process words in an ancestral 
survival scenario (e.g., “Rate how relevant each of these words would be for 
your survival if you were stranded in the grassland of a foreign land”) compared 
to other scenarios (e.g., “Rate how relevant each of these words would be if 
you were moving to a foreign land”). On a surprise memory test, subjects recall 
more words that are processed for survival than words that are processed for 
their relevance to moving (Nairne, et al., 2007; D. J. Burns, Hart, Griffith, & A. 
D. Burns, 2013), planning a vacation at a resort (Nairne, Pandeirada, & 
Thompson, 2008; D. J. Burns et al., 2013), or planning a bank heist (Kang, 
McDermott & Cohen, 2008). Survival processing also produces superior 
memory than other conditions that are widely accepted as having great 
mnemonic relevance such as rating words for their pleasantness, imagery or 
self-reference (Nairne et al., 2008). The effect has also been found using 
pictures (Otgaar, Smeets, & Van Bergen, 2010). The purpose of this 
dissertation is to examine the mnemonic value of objects with a potentially high 
survival value: living (animate) things.  
Animacy 
Intuitively, it seems as though living things have a special priority in our 
day-to-day lives. We see faces in the clouds and a man in the moon; our 
instinct tells us that the thing that goes bump in the night is a predator. We 
anthropomorphize – attribute human-like characteristics to non-human objects 
– easily and frequently. Upon coming home, I interpret my dog’s reaction as 
happiness to see me; it looks as if he pulls back his lips and smiles at me. 
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Children’s media is ripe with examples of the priority of animates. Some of 
baby’s first books teach the sounds animals make and the feel of their fur. 
Some of the most popular and timeless children’s books involve objects or 
animals that are anthropomorphized, including Where the Wild Things Are 
(Sendak, 1963), The Very Hungry Caterpillar (Carle, 1969), Charlotte’s Web 
(White, 1952), Goodnight Moon (1947), The Little Engine that Could (Piper, 
1930), and Thomas the Tank Engine from The Railway Series (Awdry, 1972). 
Similarly, many children’s movies have a host of objects that have taken on 
human characteristics such as The Brave Little Toaster (Reese, 2003), the 
dancing brooms in Fantasia (Sharpsteen & Disney, 1940), and the whole crew 
from Disney’s Beauty and the Beast (1991) including Mrs. Pots, Chip, Lumier, 
and Cogsworth to name a few. Animates are everywhere, whether or not we 
are intentionally looking for them. 
What is Animacy? 
These everyday examples converge with decades of research that 
suggest we do in fact conceptualize living things differently from non-living 
things. According to the folk biology literature, there is a ubiquitous taxonomic 
system in which living things are classified and categorized in a way that 
objects are not (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973, 1974; Medin & Atran, 2004). 
The classification of living things is typically further divided into additional 
categories, and these categories often fall into a hierarchy (e.g., humans at the 
top followed by animals then plants). However, there is often ambiguity 
surrounding the middle sections of this hierarchy. People from virtually all 
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cultures agree that humans are in a separate category from plants, but the 
distinction between humans and animals is less clear. Before ages 10 or 11, 
children typically classify humans as a unique category that is separate from 
both plants and animals. However, around this age children begin to categorize 
humans as a type of animal and therefore begin to group humans and animals 
in the same category (Carey, 1985). Modern American children are not the only 
people to make a similar human-animal distinction. The separation between 
humans and other animals dates as far back as pre-Socratic Greece. In this 
system, living things were classified as either human-like (biology) or 
nonhuman-like (zoology). Yet in both systems, living plants fall into a category 
that is distinctively separate from animals and humans (Dellantonio, 
Innamorati, & Pastore, 2012). While plants are most certainly living things, they 
do not enjoy the same special cognitive priority as other living things and have 
been wrongly categorized by children as nonliving things (Hatano et al., 1993). 
There is a critical feature absent in most plants that is present in animals and 
humans. That feature is animacy.  
To use an overly simplistic classification scheme, a living thing is 
animate if it can move on its own and has intentions or goals. A definition of 
animacy has been conspicuously absent in this manuscript until now because, 
much like the ambiguity surrounding the perception of living and nonliving 
things, the line between what is animate and what is not can also be unclear. It 
is often the case that the animate/inanimate distinction parallels the 
living/nonliving distinction, although this is not always true. It is easy to come 
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up with examples of objects that defy this sort of simple living/nonliving 
definition of animacy. The first obvious example mentioned previously is plants. 
Perhaps plants are uniformly classified differently from other living things (and 
even considered “nonliving” by children) because plants lack the primary 
indicators of animacy. This idea is captured in the definition of the word as 
found in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. The word “animate” is defined along 
the living/nonliving dimension (definitions 1, 2, and 4); “possessing or 
characterized by life,” “full of life,” and “referring to a living thing,” but also a 
distinction is made between plant and animal life in an alternative definition 
(definition 3); “of or relating to animate life as opposed to plant life”.  
To further cloud the already murky conceptualization of animacy, I will 
argue that it is unclear whether the status of “living” is actually a necessary 
feature of animacy. Consider a goat that is dead. In this case, the goat shares 
almost all of the features of a living goat with the exception that it is no longer 
alive. It seems that this goat no longer is animate. On the other hand, a 
vampire is also not living, yet shares almost all of the features of other animate, 
human-like beings. In this case, it would seem as though a vampire is animate. 
However, at this point these are all speculations because there is no hard line 
drawn between what is animate and what is inanimate. For the sake of the 
current dissertation, I am concerned with things that would be important to 
notice and remember because of their fitness value. It seems that noticing and 
remembering things that have goals and the ability to act on those goals would 
provide an advantage to survival relative to things that do not.  
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The ambiguity surrounding what is animate and what is not may stem 
from the fact that researchers from across the various fields of psychology 
have yet to agree upon a unified classification system for separating these two 
things. Fortunately, that is not to say that we are left empty-handed in this 
question to understand animacy. There are many characteristics that are used 
to inform people’s perception of animacy. The majority of these characteristics 
fall primarily into two classes: static/featural and dynamic. There are also other 
characteristics that do not fall neatly into a static or dynamic classification, such 
as using empathy to determine how similar an object is to oneself (Langacker, 
1991). However, the static/dynamic dichotomy is a useful way to consider 
animate characteristics.  
The static characteristics of animacy are based on unchanging features 
of an object such as the look or feel of the object. The most reliable static cue 
for animacy is the presence of a face. Other static features include the 
presence of legs (as opposed to wheels), skin or fur, sounds, and smells. The 
categories of static and dynamic characteristics are not mutually exclusive as 
in the case of a person’s static – but also dynamic – gaze (Gao, McCarthy, & 
Scholl, 2010; Opfer & Gelman, 2011). Often these static clues overlap with 
characteristics of living things (e.g. a table has legs) and therefore may be 
good indicators of animacy in combination with other dynamic cues.  
Perhaps the most reliable signal of animacy comes from dynamic cues 
that are based on motion. Animate objects have self-generated and self-
sustained movement such as walking or crawling (Opfer & Gelman, 2011). This 
7 
type of motion is different from other types of Newtonian motions because 
there is no other external source for the start of the motion (such as an object 
that is falling because of gravity). This movement must also be biologically 
plausible such as the pattern of motion inferred from lights that are placed on 
joints in point light walker displays (Johansson, 1973). A third dynamic 
characteristic is the perception of goal-directed movement, such as a pattern of 
movement that can be interpreted as an animal searching for dinner or 
avoiding becoming another animal’s dinner. This ability to differentiate goal-
directed movement from other movement starts as early as 3 months (Luo, 
2011). Similarly, another characteristic is that animates have contingent 
behaviors that are related in time to another action (Gergely & Watson, 1999) 
Examples of these cause-and-effect behaviors might include smiling after 
receiving a compliment, crying because something sad has happened, or 
taking an alternative route because an obstacle has been placed in the 
originally intended route. The majority of images described in this dissertation 
are based on dynamic actions.  
Detecting Animates 
There is ample evidence suggesting that people respond differently to 
animates and inanimates beginning at an early age. There are special ways 
people in every society think about living things, including tracking the 
movement of other humans (e.g., recognizing human faces; Carey & Diamond, 
1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986). People have developed specific grammar 
rules and semantic structures for pronouns and proper names (Arnold, 
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Eisenband, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2000).  Infants as young as 6.5 
months old attribute goals to moving shapes. For example, infants pay special 
attention to a circle that moves around a rectangle to reach another circle 
relative to a circle that takes the same trajectory without the rectangle (Csibra, 
Gergely, Bıŕó, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999). At 12 months, infants associate 
ordered movement with animate objects and disordered, random movement 
with inanimate objects (Newman, Keil, Kuhlmeier, & Wynn, 2010). By four 
years old, children are able to predict and explain whether unfamiliar objects 
are animate or not (Gelman, 1990). At this age children are also able to 
differentiate between things that are dead versus sleeping, despite the shared 
perceptual features (Barrett & Behne, 2005).  
This differential treatment of animate objects makes sense from an 
adaptive memory perspective. If survival depended on rapidly detecting nearby 
predators, it would be advantageous to have a cognitive system that quickly 
and easily detected living things with goals and intentions (i.e., animate things). 
People are thought to have a specialized animacy detection device to 
determine whether something is alive or is the result of a living thing (J. L. 
Barrett, 2004).  Often this animacy detection device responds quickly and 
automatically. In change-detection scenarios, people are substantially faster at 
detecting changes that involve animals relative to other categories of inanimate 
objects (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). People are easily able to detect 
animacy (even the gender of a walker) with only sparse inputs of information in 
the form of lights placed strategically on various joints on the body (Johansson, 
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1973). Our detection device is hypersensitive to animate objects, frequently 
ascribing animacy to a situation when there is none. For this reason, our 
detection system is often thought of as a hyperactive agency detection device 
(H. C. Barrett, 2005; J. L. Barrett, 2004; Tipper & Weaver, 1998). From an 
evolutionary perspective, it is more advantageous for a person to detect an 
animate when there is none than it is to fail to detect an animate, especially a 
harmful or dangerous one (J. L. Barrett, 2004). A person who mistakenly 
perceives rustling in the grass to be a poisonous snake when in reality it is the 
wind is more likely to survive than a person who mistakenly perceives the 
rustling of a snake to be the wind.  
This hyperactive agency detection device perceives animacy in unlikely 
situations. In a classic paper, Heider and Simmel (1944) showed a brief film in 
which two triangles and a circle moved around the screen in what appeared to 
be an ordered, intentional manner. Despite the fact that these were simple, 
geometric shapes that moved silently around the screen, subjects were quick 
to attribute intentions and goals to the shapes. Almost all of the subjects 
produced elaborate stories about the shapes such as a romantic tale about an 
intricate love triangle complete with character profiles for each shape including 
fearful, frustrated, and aggressive.  
However, not all movement is automatically perceived as animate. 
Whether or not geometric shapes are perceived as animate depends on the 
pattern of the movement. In a visual search task, Abrams and Christ (2006) 
demonstrated that it was the start of motion (i.e., an object that has just begun 
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to move), not motion per se, that captured attention. Furthermore, motion onset 
is only predictive of animacy if there is no physical explanation. To borrow an 
example from Scholl and Tremoulet (2000), imagine square “A” moves in a 
straight line towards square “B.” In one scenario, once “A” reaches “B,” “A” 
stops moving, and “B” starts moving along the same path.  In the other 
scenario, once “A” has almost reached “B,” “B” moves quickly away from “A” in 
a random direction until it is a few inches away from “A.” “A” then changes 
course and moves in the new direction towards “B.” Both cases are examples 
of motion onset of geometric shapes, but the two scenarios are perceived 
differently. In the first scenario “A” is seen as the cause for “B”s movement 
according to the properties of physics, but in the second scenario the squares 
become alive with potential intentional states or goals (e.g., “A” wants to catch 
“B”, or “B” is trying to escape from “A”). If an object begins to move with no 
other explanation than an internal energy source, this object is self-propelled. 
As mentioned earlier, this ability is a key characteristic of animate objects. 
Similarly, objects that move randomly and without clear goals (a characteristic 
of animate objects) capture people’s attention faster than objects that move 
predictably, as if colliding into one another (Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & Abrams, 
2010). 
Remembering Animates 
Given the information available about the importance of animacy on a 
perceptual level, it is reasonable to expect that our memory systems, like our 
perceptual systems, are tuned to remember animate things. In perhaps one of 
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the first, albeit unintentional, studies to demonstrate the mnemonic value of 
animacy, Camilleri, Kuhlmeier, and Chu (2010) used geometric shapes to 
examine the role of intentionality in helping and hindering behavior. Subjects 
viewed movies of various colored triangles in which the triangles were either 
perceived as “helping” a red ball up a slope, or hindering the ball’s progress. 
Importantly, the movement of the triangle could be perceived as intentional 
(e.g., moving on its own accord) or unintentional (e.g., falling because of 
gravity). Although animacy was not a dimension of interest to the authors, on a 
later test subjects recognized the correct color of triangle more often when the 
triangle’s motion was perceived as intentional rather than unintentional. 
Recently, the mnemonic value of animate objects has been directly 
examined with animate and inanimate stimuli. Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada, 
Cogdill, & LeBreton (2013) had subjects study a list of animate and inanimate 
words (e.g., “duck” versus “kite”) that were equated along a number of 
mnemonic-relevant dimensions. Across repeated free recall tests, subjects 
remembered more animate than inanimate words. In the current dissertation, I 
will use a modified version of this animate and inanimate word list to examine 
the mnemonic value of animate objects within the context of the method of loci. 
In addition, when Rubin and Friendly’s (1986) collection of recall norms were 
subjected to a multiple regression analysis, animacy was an important 
predictor of recall. Animacy was actually ranked as high as the three variables 
Rubin and Friendly reported were the largest determinants of memory: 
imagery, availability, and emotionality. Bonin, Gelin, and Bugaiska (2014) 
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extended the animacy effect using pictures (Experiment 1), an incidental 
learning task (Experiment 2) and a final recognition test (Experiment 3). 
The mnemonic value of animacy has also been demonstrated by 
attributing animate characteristics to non-words. In this way, subjects were 
exposed to the same stimuli but were asked to process the stimuli differently. 
VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, and Blunt (2013) attributed characteristics to 
non-words that were either typically associated with animate objects (e.g. “cries 
when upset”) or with inanimate objects (e.g., “assembled with screws”). On 
final free recall and recognition tests, non-words that were paired with animate 
characteristics were recalled and recognized more than non-words that were 
paired with inanimate characteristics. In the current dissertation, I used a 
similar method to attribute animate and inanimate characteristics to objects.  
Animacy effects have recently been found for animate stimuli in a paired 
associate task (VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Cogdill, 2015). Animate and 
inanimate words were randomly paired with Swahili words. Subjects were told 
to learn the English word associated with each Swahili word (essentially, a 
foreign language learning paradigm). On a final cued recall test, subjects 
recalled more of the animate words than inanimate words. However, there may 
be situations in which animacy effects are not found in paired associate 
learning. This is the case for paired-associate learning with emotional arousing 
stimuli (Madan, Caplan, Lau & Fujiware, 2012). In this situation, there is a 
memory advantage for the individual negative valence words at the cost of the 
associated words. Perhaps there could be similar situations in which animate 
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words are remembered at the cost of remembering the item associated with 
the animate object. Research from the perception literature has demonstrated 
that animates capture attention; therefore, it is possible that during paired 
associate learning, animate words may capture attention and therefore receive 
more processing than inanimate words. If this is the case there might be an 
advantage for animate words on a free recall test but not on a cued recall test.   
It is possible, then, that the animacy effect may not appear in an ordered 
output task. Animate words may increase the specific memory for that item at 
the cost of information about that item’s order. That is, memory for the 
individual animate items may be greater for animate words, but this memory for 
the individual items may impair the memory for serial order. This type of 
dissociation for item and order memory has been demonstrated with the 
generation effect. Across three experiments, subjects completed word 
fragments aloud of some words (the generation condition) and simply read 
aloud the others (the read only condition). As is typically the case (see 
Slamecka & Graf, 1978), generating the words improved the memory for the 
individual items. However, generating the words impaired memory for the order 
of those words as measured by order reconstruction tasks and input-output 
correspondence measures of recall (Nairne, Riegler, & Serra, 1991). In the 
present experiments, the effect of animacy was tested in an ordered output 
task. This ordered output task was the method of loci.  
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Method of Loci 
What is the method of loci? In the popular British Broadcasting 
Corporation television series based off of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s classic 
stories, “Sherlock Holmes”, Dr. Stapleton asks the same question when 




DR. JOHN WATSON: It's a memory technique, a sort of mental 
map. You plot a...a map with a location - it doesn't have to 
be a real place - and then you deposit memories there 
that...theoretically, you can never forget anything. All you 
have to do is find your way back to it. 
DR. STAPLETON: So this imaginary location could be anything - 
a house, a street...? 
DR. JOHN WATSON: Yeah. 
DR. STAPLETON: It's a palace. He said it was a palace. 
DR. JOHN WATSON: Yeah, well, he would, wouldn't he?  
 
(Gatiss, Moffat, & Doyle, 2012, 1:10:05) 
 
 
Not only would Sherlock Holmes choose to call his set of internal 
location cues a palace, but so would many others after him, including many top 
memory athletes. But before I get into the details about how memory athletes 
use the method – and what the existent literature says about it – or why it is 
particularly well-suited for the present study of animacy, I will first provide an 
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accurate explanation of the technique (You were on the right track, Watson!) 
and provide a brief history.  
To use the method of loci, a person creates images of to-be-
remembered items and then mentally places these images in distinguishable 
locations along a path, often in a building such as a house (or, in Holmes’s 
case, a palace). To recall the items, the person mentally retraces his/her steps 
along the path and virtually “looks” at each location to identify the items that 
were previously placed there. This technique is not new to the 2012 television 
show, nor was it new in 1902 at the time when Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
published the story quoted above, The Hound of the Baskervilles.  
A Brief History of the Method of Loci 
Legend traces the origins of the method of loci to as early as 500 B.C.E 
at a banquet given by a nobleman in Ancient Greece. (Yates, 1966). The 
nobleman hired Simonides of Ceos to deliver a poem in his honor at the 
banquet, but Simonedes dedicated only half of the poem to honoring the host 
and the other half to honoring the twin gods, Castor and Pollux. When the 
nobleman heard the poem, he was enraged that he received only half of the 
honor and praise he expected and refused to pay Simonides the agreed upon 
price. Instead, the nobleman offered only half of the payment and insisted 
Simonides ask Castor and Pollux for the rest of the payment. Soon after, a 
messenger informed Simonides that two men, later assumed to be Castor and 
Pollux, were waiting to see him outside of the banquet hall. While Simonides 
was outside waiting for the two men, an earthquake struck, destroying the 
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banquet hall and killing all the attendees inside the ruins. The damage from the 
earthquake left the guests unidentifiable even to their family members. To 
recall who was there for the burials, Simonides imagined the seating 
arrangement of the guests at the banquet hall. He then mentally walked 
through the former banquet hall and identified every guest who had attended. 
But Simonides did not stop there. He realized that this technique could be used 
to remember other things besides guests, perhaps famous poets, objects, or 
even poems. And so the method of loci was born (and beware he who dare 
cross the gods! Cicero 55 B.C.E./1970). 
Before external mnemonic devices such as paper or the latest iPhone 
were readily available, memory was considered to be a critical component of 
speech. As such, the techniques of remembering were included in every school 
of rhetoric (Yates, 1966). There are three surviving Latin sources that 
described this often-called “art of memory” for the aspiring student of rhetoric. 
The earliest and most informative text, Rhetorica ad Herennium, was written 
around 90 B.C.E. and does not bear the name of the author, only that it was a 
treatise on rhetoric for a man named Herennius. This anonymous manuscript is 
the source for the majority of surviving information about how to use the 
method of loci and was likely the gold-standard of mnemonics in the ancient 
world. In it the author distinguishes between two types of memory: natural 
memory and artificial memory – a distinction that remains today (Worthen & 
Hunt, 2011). Despite two thousand years, the techniques laid out in this book 
are still largely unchanged, to such an extent that world memory champion Ed 
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Cooke said of it, “This book is our bible” (Foer, 2011, p. 93). The two later 
works, Cicero’s 55 B.C.E. De Oratore and Quintilian’s 95 C.E. Instituto de 
Oratoria, likely assumed readers were familiar with this book (Yates, 1966) and 
consist of related information (e.g., the origins story described above from de 
Oratore and Quintillian’s opinion that the method seems rather artificial and 
unhelpful from Instituo de Oratoria). For these reasons, Ad Herennium will be 
the primary ancient source referenced in this manuscript.  
By the Middle Ages, the method of loci had fallen out of favor and was 
replaced with other mnemonics such as the linking-by-story method and 
general organizational strategies. With the exception of the Puritans, who 
considered the often off-color use of imagery idolatrous, the method of loci 
enjoyed another period of popularity during the Renaissance. Several notable 
individuals who used the method of loci during this time were Peter of Ravenna 
and Matteo Ricci. Peter of Ravenna (c. 1448-1508) was a lawyer who is best 
known for his book, Phoenix seu artificiosa memoria, in which he described his 
extensive use of mnemonic techniques like the method of loci (Yates, 1966). 
Later, the Italian Matteo Ricci (c. 1582–1610) reported using hundreds of 
churches to hold items in memory during his time as a Jesuit missionary in 
China. His book is called, A Treatise on Mnemonics and is described in the 
book The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci (Spence, 1985). Worthen and Hunt 
(2011) speculate that the method of loci, and mnemonics in general, fell out of 
favor after Ebbinghaus’s 1885 monograph which was concerned with “natural” 
memory. Five years later, however, William James acknowledges in his 
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foundational 1890 book, Principles of Psychology, the benefits of using 
mnemonic techniques. 
Currently, universities no longer focus on rhetoric or memorization, 
choosing instead to emphasize complex learning and application skills such as 
logic and critical analysis. The method of loci is now often reduced to just a 
gimmicky party trick (Worthen & Hunt, 2011). However, the appearance of the 
method of loci in popular media outlets (including Joshua Foer’s Moonwalking 
with Einstein and the BBC’s Sherlock) has once again aroused some curiosity 
about the method. Joshua Foer’s book provides detailed descriptions of the 
techniques used by several successful memory champions. For that reason, it 
will be frequently cited throughout the section about recommendations.  
Today, the method of loci is one of the most popular mnemonic 
techniques used by memory athletes around the world. Last year, 169 people 
with quite ordinary memory abilities gathered at Haikou, China to compete in a 
variety of memory competitions. There, these ordinary people accomplished 
quite extraordinary feats of memory, memorizing in minutes what most of us 
would only dream of memorizing in weeks or months. According to the World 
Memory Championship website, notable contestants of last year’s competition 
include 11-year-old Chen Zeqi who memorized 15 decks of playing cards in 
one hour and 2014 World Memory Champion Jonas von Essen who 
memorized 95 random words in 5 minutes and 106 historic dates in 5 minutes 
(World Memory Statistics, 2015). How did Jonas von Essen and Chen Zeqi 
memorize so many things in so little time? By now it is probably obvious what 
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the answer, or at least part of the answer, is: They used a memory palace. It is 
important to realize that these memory athletes like Moonwalking with Einstein 
author, Joshua Foer, are not savants born with superior memory abilities. 
Rather, these are people who have spent hours training to use certain 
mnemonic techniques like the method of loci. In a recent article aimed at 
exploring 10 people with extraordinary memory abilities, 9 of the 10 reported 
using the method of loci (Maguire, Valentine, Widing & Kapur, 2003). Below I 
will describe recommendations advocated by method of loci experts from both 
over 2000 years ago and present day; the surprising reality is that the method 
has changed little since its inception. I will then examine these 
recommendations through the lenses of a cognitive psychologist and discuss 
empirical evidence in favor of or against these various recommendations.  
How to Build a Memory Palace 
Memory athletes such as Joshua Foer and Ed Cooke recommend 
several techniques to increase the effectiveness of the method of loci. The 
majority of these recommendations were originally described in the Latin 
sources, Ad Herennium in particular (Foer, 2011). There is not much in the way 
of empirical evidence that any of these recommendations actually enhance the 
mnemonic value of the method, although several recommendations capitalize 
on well-established processes known to improve memory in the cognitive 
sciences, in particular organization and distinctiveness (Worthen & Hunt, 
2008).  
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A basic component and recommendation of the method of loci is to 
create images. This recommendation is likely for a good reason. Within 
cognitive psychology, it is widely accepted that people have an impressive 
ability to remember images (Crowder, 1976; Paivio & Csapo, 1973). In a two-
choice forced recognition test of 68 items, subjects recognized 88.4% of the 
words, and 96.0% of the pictures (Shepard, 1967). Across 8 hours, Standing, 
Conezio, and Haber (1970), showed subjects 2560 pictures of family vacations, 
which included people, cities, and vegetation. On a two-choice recognition test 
of a sample of 280 of the original pictures, subjects correctly identified about 
90% of the pictures. Another group of subjects who viewed 1000 extra pictures 
scored similarly. People have an impressive ability to recognize images, 
although these experiments say nothing of a person’s ability to recall those 
images.  
In addition to recalling images, the process of creating images has 
played an important role in memory throughout the history of experimental 
psychology (Paivio, 1969). As early as 1937, Fernberger described a 
procedure similar to the peg-word method in which words that rhyme with 
numbers are used as a framework to organize to-be-remembered items. In this 
method, an interactive image of the to-be-remembered word is formed with a 
peg-word. In one of the earliest demonstrations of imagery in modern 
experimental psychology, Miller, Galanter & Pribram (1960) used a list of 10 
peg-words that rhymed with the numerals 1 through 10 (bun, shoe, tree, door, 
hive, sticks, heaven, gate, wine, and hen). Several years later, Bugelski, Kidd, 
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and Segmen (1968) provided one of the first controlled experiments of the peg-
word mnemonic and demonstrated that images can serve as mediators in 
memory. Subjects created their own images and followed a strict recall strategy 
during retrieval, much like subjects do when using the method of loci. On these 
associate recall tasks, it was important whether the to-be-remembered word 
and peg-word interacted: When people were given instructions to form an 
interactive image of word pairs, recall performance was much higher both on 
immediate and delayed tests relative to control subjects who used rote 
repetition (Bower, 1972; see also Wollen, Weber, & Lower, 1972). Therefore 
another recommendation from cognitive psychology may be that the method of 
loci may be most effective when images are created in which objects and 
locations interact. Many examples given by memory athletes include examples 
of the to-be-remembered word interacting with the location (Roediger & Dellis, 
2014). 
Some memory athletes further believe that images rich in sensory 
features may be more memorable than less descriptive images. A mental 
image of a cat noisily eating or old and smelly gym socks are thought to be 
more memorable than only the image of a cat or pair of socks (Bower, 1970; 
Foer, 2011). Images are also thought to be more memorable if they are funny 
(Foer, 2011), colorful (Bower, 1970), or sad (Roediger & Dellis, 2014). It is 
possible that creating richer images is a form of elaboration which could lead to 
higher levels of recall.  
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Memory champions advise people who use the method of loci to create 
images that are distinct (Worthen & Hunt, 2011; Foer, 2011). The author of Ad 
Herennium provided the example that sunrises and sunsets, unlike solar 
eclipses, are unexceptional – and therefore unmemorable – because they 
occur so often. Memory champion Ed Cooke explained, “The general idea … is 
to change whatever boring thing is being inputted into your memory into 
something that is so colorful, so exciting, and so different from anything you’ve 
seen before that you can’t possibly forget it” (Foer, 2011 p.99). There is no 
direct test of this advice within the method of loci, but it is not a stretch to 
imagine that distinct images would be recalled more than images that are not 
distinct. Distinctiveness has played a role in cognition since von Restorff’s 
(1933) experiments in which unique items were recalled more than the 
remaining items, and distinctiveness has continued to play a key role in many 
views of memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Hunt & 
McDaniel, 1993; Nairne, 2006). On the other hand, the improved memory for 
the distinct items may hurt the recall of the remaining items, resulting in no 
overall change in memory for the entire list. To take it a step further, there 
could be improved memory for the items but worse memory for order, as is the 
case with the item-order dissociation seen in the generation effect (Nairne et 
al., 1991). This impaired order information may be particularly detrimental in 
the method of loci because the method’s mnemonic benefits are driven largely 
in part from the availability of the encoding order during retrieval.  
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Other recommendations have potential adaptive underpinnings such as 
creating images that are sexual, animate, or disgusting. Following the advice 
established in Ad Herennium, Joshua Foer recommended creating images that 
are sexual such as an image of Claudia Schiffer swimming in cottage cheese 
naked (Foer, 2011). Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci also acknowledged using 
lewd imagery in his memory palaces (Spencer, 1985). It is reasonable to 
expect, from a functional memory perspective, that sexual images could be 
remembered well because of their mating cues (Ryan & Jetha, 2010). The next 
recommendation is directly related to the topic of this dissertation: Animate 
images are thought to produce a mnemonic advantage over inanimate images. 
Joshua Foer wrote of the advice given to him by his memory coach, Ed Cooke: 
“‘Now, anthropomorphizing the bottles of wine is quite a good idea,’ Ed 
suggested. ‘Animate images tend to be more memorable than inanimate 
images.’ That advice, too, came from the Ad Herennium.” (Foer, 2011, p. 101). 
Motion is also thought to enhance the memorability of images, although 
whether it is motion per se or motion onset (a featural cue for animacy, as 
discuss earlier) was not described. An example of giving motion to images is 
hot dogs rolling down the driveway (Bower, 1970). Perhaps the driveway in 
Bower’s mind was slanted and the hot dogs were merely following the laws of 
gravity. But perhaps the hotdogs were moving of their own accord, maybe 
rolling to get off the driveway. Bower does not specify. Disfigured images are 
also advised such as ripe tomatoes splattered on the front door (Bower, 1970) 
or tomato sauce on a pizza that is made out of rat blood (Roediger & Dellis, 
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2014). Perhaps these people have unknowingly stumbled across another 
potentially adaptive feature of memory: Enhanced memory for things that are 
potentially harmful due to risk of contagion from a disease or illness.  
Perhaps the most popular recommendation is to create images that are 
bizarre. It may also be the recommendation about which cognitive psychology 
has the most to say. The idea that, when using the method of loci, images 
should be bizarre is as old as the method itself. It has been advocated by 
ancient Romans (Ad Herennium), memory champions (Foer, 2011; Roediger & 
Dellis, 2014), modern self-help authors (Lorayne & Lucas, 2012), and 
educators (Tess, Hutchinson, Treloar, & Junkins, 1999). The mnemonic value 
of bizarre imagery is not intuitive and was a source of considerable debate 
among experimental psychologists for decades.  
Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding the 
conditions under which bizarre images are more memorable than ordinary 
images. When bizarreness first captured the attention of memory researchers, 
it was assumed that bizarre images were more memorable than ordinary 
images (e.g., Roth, 1961). However, in an experiment examining recall of word 
pairs, Wollen et al. (1972) called into question this pervasive assumption. 
Wollen et al. (1972) demonstrated that it was not bizarreness per se that 
enhanced recall, but rather it was the interaction of the two word pairs. For 
example, to remember the word pair “piano-cigar”, the bizarre image of the 
piano smoking the cigar was equally memorable as the ordinary image of the 
cigar resting on the piano. They proposed that creating an interaction of the 
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two words often lead people to create bizarre images (such as the piano 
smoking the cigar), which lead to the superstition that it was bizarreness, rather 
than interactivity, that improved memory for those pairs. (As an aside, it would 
also be interesting to further examine these interactive images for another 
potential confound: animacy. The words could be examined individually to see 
if bizarre images that are animate, such as the piano smoking the cigar, are 
more memorable than bizarre images that are inanimate, such as a cigar 
burning at both ends). By the late 1970s, bizarre imagery was generally 
considered to provide no extra mnemonic advantage (Crowder, 1976; 
Postman, 1975). However, the case against the mnemonic value of bizarre 
imagery was not closed. Shortly after Crowder’s and Postman’s remarks, 
several demonstrations of the mnemonic advantages of bizarre imagery 
reappeared (Merry, 1980; Webber & Marshall, 1978; Wollen & Cox, 1981a, 
1981b). By the mid-1980s the literature was ripe with evidence supporting both 
viewpoints.   
A decade after Postman’s and Crowder’s seemingly conclusive 
statements, McDaniel and Einstein (1986) demonstrated across five 
experiments that bizarre images may be more memorable than ordinary 
images but only under certain conditions. In their incidental learning tasks, 
subjects were asked to rate the vividness of mental images created for three 
underlined words that were embedded in sentences. The context of the 
sentence was either bizarre (e.g., “The dog rode the bicycle down the street.”) 
or ordinary (e.g., “The dog chased the bicycle down the street.”) On a surprise 
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recall test, subjects recalled more words from sentences from bizarre contexts 
than words from ordinary contexts, but only when the list of sentences 
contained both bizarre and ordinary sentences (that is, a mixed design). The 
bizarreness effect occurred when the initial imagery task was self-paced or 
experimenter-paced, but did not appear on a recognition test. Kroll and Tu 
(1988) found a similar pattern of results on both an immediate and delayed 
recall test: Across six experiments, bizarre imagery improved memory only in a 
mixed list design. Many others have since found similar bizarreness effects in 
which bizarreness only improves memory in mixed list designs (Campos, 
Gómez-Juncal, & Pérez-Fabello, 2008; Macklin & McDaniel, 2005; McDaniel, 
Einstein, DeLosh, May & Brady, 1995). McDaniel and Einstein (1986) proposed 
the now largely accepted idea that bizarre imagery enhances memory in mixed 
lists designs because bizarre images are more distinct.  
This prevailing explanation of the bizarreness effect is that bizarre 
images are easier to access but once accessed fail to provide a boost in the 
recovery of the information within that image. In McDaniel and Einstein’s 
(1986) experiments, this meant that the bizarre contexts were recalled more 
than the ordinary contexts, but the individual words within the sentence were 
not recalled more. Kroll and Tu (1988) found similar evidence: On average, 
words in the bizarre sentences were recalled more, but the average number of 
underlined words recalled per sentence was higher in the ordinary sentences. 
The subject may have recalled that something odd was riding a bike 
somewhere but were unable to recall that it was a dog riding the bike down the 
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street. It is generally thought that the bizarreness effect is therefore due to the 
retrievability of the image rather than the discriminability of the individual items 
within the image. Said another way, bizarre images help retrieve the image, but 
it is at the cost of recalling the specific items within the image.  
When people use the method of loci, the mental path provides them with 
a retrieval strategy, or retrieval context. It is then up to the user to discriminate 
what object was placed in that location/context. The experiments by McDaniel 
and Einstein (1986) showed that when the context was given back to subjects 
in a recognition test, bizarre words were not recovered more frequently than 
non-bizarre words. It would be unlikely, then, that bizarre imagery in the 
context of the method of loci would be more memorable than ordinary imagery. 
There are similar findings with cued recall; Wollen and Cox (1981a) found an 
advantage of bizarre imagery on a free recall test, but not on a cued recall test.  
While some early assumptions were made about the necessity of 
bizarre images in the method of loci, the majority of cognitive psychologists 
seemed to have dismissed this assumption. However, there has yet to be an 
empirical demonstration one way or the other. Over 40 years ago, the belief 
that bizarre imagery was a key ingredient was assumed among several 
researchers who were examining the method of loci, (Crovitz, 1971; Briggs, 
Hawkins, & Crovitz, 1970). At the same time, however, Gordon Bower 
concluded that the notion was “entirely negative” (Bower, 1970, p. 501). To 
support his evaluation, Bower (1970) described a series of 4 experiments 
relayed to him in a personal communication, yet the experiments he described 
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appeared to only address the issue of whether bizarre images are more 
memorable than ordinary images, which we now know from the previous 
section depends on several additional factors such as list composition and the 
way in which memory for those images is tested. Bower’s described 
experiments do not speak directly to whether or not bizarre images are more 
memorable in the context of the method of loci. Briggs, Hawkins, & Crovitz 
(1970) assumed bizarre imagery was critical and reported providing subjects 
with a location in capital letters followed by a description of a bizarre image. 
Yet it is unclear if they actually used bizarre imagery in their experiment and 
they did not provide any measure (objective or subjective) of bizarreness. 
Glancing at the images, some intuitively seem less bizarre than others (e.g., 
NURSERY. Picture the nursery children playing the game ‘ring around the 
rosey’” versus “BOOK SHOP. Picture a tongue being used as a bookmark.”). In 
perhaps the best controlled demonstration of the method of loci, Roediger 
(1980) dismisses the notion that bizarre imagery enhances memory in the 
method of loci and, like Bower (1970), cites work from classic imagery 
experiments (Wollen et al., 1972). However, he notes that there really is no 
empirical evidence one way or the other.  
While much attention has been paid to the process of creating images, 
far less attention has been devoted to describing the ideal conditions for the 
locations. Yates (1966) described several recommendations, drawing primarily 
from Ad Herennium. The best locations are thought to be isolated, solitary, and 
free of people. Each location should be distinct from one another so the 
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locations are not confused with one another (e.g., numerous identical columns 
in a temple). The locations should be well-lit and moderately-sized so that the 
images are identifiable. If the memory palace is too small, then images will be 
crowded; if the palace is too large than the images will be lost. German 
memory champion and journalist Florian Dellé, who has written numerous 
articles describing mnemonic techniques to beginners interested in competing 
themselves or just interested in learning the tricks of the trade, also provides 
some recommendations about the locations.  In addition to the advice laid out 
in Ad Herennium, he advises people to use the first location that comes to mind 
when mentally traveling along the path. He also advises people to place 
images every 10 feet along the path and consistently move along the path in 
either a clockwise or counter-clockwise order (Dellé, n. d.).  
There is no empirical research to confirm or reject these ideas about the 
locations, but the process of creating the path provides people with an 
organizational strategy that is used during encoding and retrieval. Decades of 
research in cognitive science has demonstrated that organized information is 
easier to remember than unorganized information (Jenkins and Russell, 1952; 
Bower, Clark, Lesgold, & Winzenz, 1969; Mandler, 1967). By placing items 
along an ordered set of locations, subjects are organizing the to-be-
remembered items. Additionally, when subjects retrace the path during 
retrieval, they are possibly reinstating the original spatial context, which results 
in distinct cues during retrieval that match the cues during encoding (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973). When subjects wish to recall the items, the predetermined 
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familiar set of locations is as readily available to subjects as they were during 
encoding. Each location serves as a distinct retrieval cue to a particular item 
that provides subjects with a clear retrieval strategy (Bower, 1970). Therefore, 
the items placed in the locations are more accessible during recall (Groninger, 
1971). Furthermore, because the locations are fixed and each item is 
associated to a location and not another item, forgetting one item should not 
disrupt the recall of other items (Roediger, 1980). The organization used in the 
method of loci may have particular mnemonic value because it makes use of 
spatial navigation, which likely played an important role in the evolution of our 
cognitive functions. Additionally, the method of loci may capitalize on people’s 
superior navigation in the presence of familiar landmarks (Maguire, Burgess, & 
O’Keefe, 1999; Siegal & White, 1975; Ruddle, Payne, & Jones, 1997).   
Empirical Evidence for the Method of Loci  
In the previous section, I discussed how the method of loci is used, 
along with specific recommendations from people who have used it. When 
possible, I provided evidence from psychological research to support or 
dismiss these recommendations. The bulk of the experiments described, 
however, were not directly concerned with the method of loci, and specific 
comments that I cited were often not the topic of those researchers’ 
experiments. More importantly, I have not established the effectiveness of the 
method of loci through empirical demonstrations. In this section I review the 
available empirical evidence in support of the effectiveness of the method of 
loci. 
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Although controlled experiments examining the method of loci are rare, 
the results can be quite impressive (Bower, 1970). In perhaps one of the 
earliest demonstrations of the method of loci, Ross and Lawrence (1968) 
taught five subjects a path with 52 locations that were later used across four 
successive days to learn 40 words that were viewed at the subjects’ own pace 
(about 14 seconds per word). On an immediate recall test, subjects recalled on 
average 38 words; on a test a day later subjects recalled 34 of the 40 words. In 
one of the first experiments to compare the method of loci to a control 
condition, Roediger (1980) demonstrated that mnemonic techniques (imagery, 
the link method, peg-word method, and the method of loci) produced a 
mnemonic advantage relative to rehearsal. In particular, the method of loci and 
peg-word method were especially useful when the order of the items was 
important. Massen & Vaterrodt-Plünnecke (2006) replicated these findings with 
categorized lists and also showed that the locations can be reused with 
minimal proactive interference. Lee and Ewards (1981) demonstrated that 
students who used the method of loci remembered more than students who 
used verbal elaboration. De Beni and Cornoldi extended the basic findings with 
word lists to word triplets (e.g., KEY-PARADE-FLY); subjects recalled more 
word triplets using the method of loci compared to an image only control (De 
Beni & Cornoldi, 1985). The method has also been used often in combination 
with other techniques to improve memory in older adults (Verhaeghen & Kliegl, 
2000; Yesavage & Rose, 1983). In a meta-analysis aimed at examining the 
effects of various mnemonic techniques on older adults, the method of loci was 
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reported to have a Cohen’s d of 0.80 [0.58, 1.02] (Verhaeghen, Marcoen, & 
Gosseens, 1992).  
The basic procedures of the method of loci have largely remained 
unchanged for over two thousand years, but the mnemonic device does appear 
to be flexible in how it is used. For example, often people were asked to first 
memorize a set of locations, usually in a separate session (e.g., De Beni & 
Cornoldi, 1985; Roediger, 1980). However, this does not appear to be 
necessary. Crovitz (1969) provided subjects with a map of an imaginary street 
with various locations (e.g., “electric company,” “gas station,” “florist”). On a 
final recall test, subjects were given back the locations and recalled an average 
of 34 out of 40 words in the correct order. It is difficult to interpret the 
effectiveness of this method because the author reports that 2 of the 12 
subjects missed 19 and 29 words, respectively. On one hand, the average 
number of words recalled may be near ceiling for the majority of subjects. On 
the other hand, it appears as though 10% of the subjects were unable to 
successfully use the method. Briggs, Hawkins, & Crovitz (1970) extended this 
idea and also provided subjects with the locations and images (e.g., “Electric 
company: picture a PLOW cutting an underground cable. The word is PLOW,” 
“Gas station: Picture the attendant angrily driving a NAIL into your tire. The 
word is NAIL.”) When given the locations and images by the experimenter, 
subjects recalled an average of 17 out of 20 words. This procedure has also 
been used with subjects as young as 9 and as old as 78 years old (Brehmer, 
Li, Muller, Oertzen, and Lindenberger, 2007; see also Lee & Edwards, 1981). 
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However, in all of these cases it is unknown how many words subjects in a 
self-generated condition might have recalled had such a condition existed. It is 
possible that recall performance may have been higher in a condition in which 
subjects created their own images.  
Similarly, Legge, Madan, Ng, & Caplan (2012) used a computer-
generated virtual reality environment in place of familiar locations. It is possible 
that people do not need to create their own locations, but there has yet to be 
enough controlled comparisons to make this claim. In addition, in their recent 
book, Mnemonology: Mnemonics for the 21st Century, Worthen and Hunt 
(2011) concluded that self-generated mnemonics (not specifically the method 
of loci) are more effective than other-generated mnemonics  when the 
mnemonic is easier to use (Ironsmith & Lutz, 1996; Jamieson & Schimpf, 1980) 
but not when mnemonics are difficult such as the phonetic mnemonic system 
(Patton, D’Aaro, & Gaudette, 1991). Whether the method of loci is an easy to 
use mnemonic or a difficult mnemonic is up for debate.  
Up until now, the method of loci has been described to remember simple 
one-word materials, typically objects. The method has also been used with 
complex materials. The mnemonic improved high school students’ recall of 
lengthy passages compared to students who used rehearsal (Bellezza, 1981) 
and may be more beneficial when the text is heard out loud rather than read 
silently (Cornoldi & De Beni, 1991; De Beni, Moe, & Cornoldi, 1997; Moe & De 
Beni, 2005). Medical students who used the method of loci to learn about the 
endocrine system performed better on a final multiple choice test than did 
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students who learned the same information in lecture format (Qureshi, Rizvi, 
Syed, Shahid, & Manzoor, 2014).    
Up to this point, I described what the method of loci is and have shown 
that it was not only a popular tool among ancient orators, but that it also 
remains in use today as one of the foundational techniques used during 
memory competitions worldwide. I also discussed recommendations of how to 
use it and, when possible, discussed what the literature from cognitive science 
says about those recommendations. Finally, I reviewed the available literature 
concerning the method, which is rather limited. The present experiments will 
use the method of loci to answer questions concerning the mnemonic value of 
animacy and will also address some unresolved questions about the method of 
loci, specifically concerning bizarre imagery and the lack of a control condition 
for comparison.  
Experiments 
The following experiments were aimed at exploring the mnemonic 
effects of animacy in the method of loci – a context that provides people with a 
pre-existing organization structure. There are several reasons why the method 
of loci was used in the present experiments. As mentioned in a previous 
section, the primary reason is concerned with animacy. In the current 
experiment, the method provided a salient organizational strategy during 
encoding that was then available again during retrieval. As a result, the recall 
test was not a free recall test that relied on subjects’ unique output strategy, but 
rather the test held the output strategy constant across subjects so that the 
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recall test was primarily a measure of item-specific information. If these 
experiments used a typical free recall test, I would expect an effect of animacy 
such that animate words and images would be recalled more than inanimate 
words and images. However, the current experiment did not use a traditional 
free recall task. Instead, subjects were provided with an explicit output strategy 
that relied heavily on the encoding order. It is unclear whether the animacy 
effect would persist in such a context and, if so, whether the effect would be 
smaller relative to a control condition that did not rely on output order (e.g., 
making pleasantness ratings).   
Furthermore, it could be argued that the animacy effect occurs not 
because animates are innately more memorable, but because they belong to 
the same category and therefore can be categorized at output. Despite 
researchers’ best attempts to equate the animate and inanimate word pairs 
along various important cognitive dimensions including category size and 
instance, if the animacy effect is due to categorization during retrieval, an 
organizational strategy like the method of loci should eliminate the effect. I do 
not predict that the animacy effect is due to categorization during retrieval.  
 Finally, in the present experiments subjects associated images of words 
to specific locations, a task that may have similarities to a paired associate 
task. Animates may capture attention or be more memorable at the cost of the 
paired associate (as was the case with negative valence words in Madan et al., 
2012). If this is the case, then the location associated with the animate image 
may have been forgotten resulting in worse performance for animate words 
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because the mnemonic strategy would be unavailable during recall (i.e., the 
locations would not be available to cue the retrieval of the animate words).  
A secondary reason for using the method of loci in the present 
experiment was to examine the method in controlled experiments. In the first 
experiment, the method of loci was compared to a control condition 
(pleasantness ratings) that is traditionally considered one of the best deep, 
encoding tasks (e.g., Packman & Battig, 1978). If the claims of memory 
champions are to be believed, then subjects who used the method of loci 











The primary goal of this experiment was to determine if the animacy 
effect existed in recall with a fixed or predetermined output order as in the 
method of loci, and if so, whether the effect was similar for the method of loci 
and the pleasantness control condition. Subjects learned a list of words; half of 
the words were animate and the other half were inanimate. These words were 
matched along 10 memory-relevant dimensions (see Nairne et al., 2013; 
VanArsdall et al., 2015). In one condition, subjects were taught to use the 
method of loci to memorize a list of words for a later free recall test. In an 
incidental learning control condition, subjects rated the pleasantness of each 
word – a task that draws attention to the unique characteristics of an item and 
is traditionally considered to be one of the best deep encoding tasks (e.g., 
Packman & Battig,1978). If this experiment was a typical free recall 
experiment, I would expect that memory for animate objects would be better 
than memory for inanimate objects because animate objects hold a privileged 
place in our adaptive memories. For this reason, I expected an animacy 
advantage in the pleasantness condition. However, the following experiment 
was unlike the free recall experiments in which adaptive memory is typically 
examined. Here, the method of loci provided subjects with an encoding and 
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output strategy that emphasized the temporal order of the words. If animate 
objects increase memory for the animate item but reduce memory for order or 
the associated location, the mnemonic effects of animacy would be lessened or 
nonexistent in the method of loci condition relative to the pleasantness control 
condition. A second goal of Experiment 1 was to demonstrate the mnemonic 
superiority of the method of loci relative to a control. If the method of loci is truly 
a powerful mnemonic technique, then subjects who used the method of loci 
should recall more words than subjects who made pleasantness ratings.  
Method 
Subjects 
One hundred and fifty-four subjects (94 female, 60 male) were recruited 
online via a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) posted on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. An additional 27 subjects were tested and excluded from data analysis 
for the following reasons: 1 subject indicated cheating on the task, 9 subjects 
reported computer/user errors, and 16 did not comply with instructions during 
the method of loci task (9 subjects left more than 6 responses blank during 
study, 3 subjects retyped the word instead of creating an image, and 4 subjects 
were determined to be completely off task which included responding to words 
with memories from childhood or writing various locations across the world). 
Subjects were restricted to people who were located in the United States, had 
a 95% HIT acceptance rate, and had completed at least 1000 HITs. 
Demographic information (age, gender, native-language) was collected at the 
beginning of the study (see Table 1), and additional information about the 
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workers’ environment, whether they cheated, and computer specifications were 
collected in a post-experiment questionnaire. The mean age of the subjects 
was 36.7 years (SD = 12.13, range = 18-69). Subjects were paid $1.50 to 
complete the task, which lasted about 20 - 25 min.  
Design 
This experiment used a 2 (word type: animate, inanimate) x 2 (condition: 
method of loci, pleasantness) repeated measures design with word as a within-
subjects factor and condition as a between subjects factor. There were 77 
subjects in the pleasantness condition and 77 in the method of loci condition. 
Number of words recalled on an immediate recall test was the dependent 
variable.  
Materials 
A list of 30 words1, of which 15 were animate and 15 were inanimate, 
were selected from Nairne et al. (2013; note that 6 additional words were 
added to the original 24 words to create a list of 30). The two sets of word 
types (animate and inanimate) were matched along 10 relevant dimensions: 
age of acquisition, category size, category typicality, concreteness, familiarity, 
imagery, written frequency, meaningfulness, number of letters, and 
																																																								
1	Due to a program error that occurred with the first 120 subjects, only 14 inanimate words 
appeared, resulting in a total of 29 words instead of the intended 30 words. The program error 
was fixed and an additional 17 subjects were then included in both the pleasantness and 
method of loci conditions for a total of 34 additional subjects. These additional 34 subjects who 
were shown all 30 words showed the same pattern of results as the original 120 subjects. 
Therefore, the results are reported with all 154 subjects.	
40 
relatedness. For additional information about these dimensions and a complete 
list of words, see Appendix C. 
Procedure 
After workers accepted the HIT, electronically signed the informed 
consent, and completed the demographic information, the experiment began. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the method of loci condition or the 
pleasantness ratings condition. All subjects then took a final recall test followed 
by a post-experiment questionnaire.  
In the method of loci condition, the subjects were first given basic 
instructions. They were told they would learn a list of words by imagining 
placing items along a familiar path, such as a childhood home. On a later test, 
they would be asked to mentally retrace their steps to recall the items placed in 
each location. Subjects were also given examples of how the method of loci 
might be used to remember a couple practice words (e.g., “imagine that the 
PEACH is so large that it is blocking you from the driveway”). For the complete 
instructions used in Experiment 1, see Appendix D. 
The to-be-remembered words were presented in a random order one at 
a time for each subject. After the presentation of each word, subjects typed in a 
box labeled “Location” the location where they imagined placing the word and 
typed in a box labeled “Image” a brief description of the image. The task was 
self-paced, and subjects spent on average 10.8 min in total for this task. After 
the final word was presented, subjects were asked to recall the words by 
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mentally walking through their house and remembering the objects they placed 
there. Subjects were given 4 min for this task.  
In the pleasantness condition, subjects rated the pleasantness of each 
word on a 5-point scale, with 1 being very offensive and 5 being very pleasant. 
Although the instructions for the pleasantness rating task did not explicitly 
mention a final recall test, the description for the HIT informed subjects that 
they would be asked to memorize a list of 30 words. The task was self-paced, 
and subjects spent an average of 2.5 min in total for this task. After the final 
word was rated, subjects were asked to recall as many of the words as they 
could in 4 min.  
Results 
Initial Method of Loci and Pleasantness Performance 
A preliminary analysis eliminated subjects who did not appear to 
complete the method of loci task. To do this, I developed a list of minimum 
requirements for inclusion based on subjects’ image and location responses. 
Subjects’ were included if their responses: (1) have no more than 6 blanks, (2) 
consist of more than the retyped word and, perhaps most importantly, (3) 
contain locations rather than random memories associated with each item2 or 
																																																								
2 For example, for the word “journal” a subject wrote “during my college days” for the location 
and “me myself serving one among the editorial member of college journal” for the image; for 
the word “rake” the subject wrote “during trekking” for the location and “As bachelors we used 
to rake frequently for trekking and other adventurous activities” for the image. 
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free associations to the item that do not resemble anything like a path3. As 
stated in the previous section, 16 out of 77 people (9 of whom were eliminated 
for leaving more than 6 blanks) did not meet these criteria and were replaced. 
Subjects in the pleasantness condition were eliminated if they made the same 
rating for all words or left more than 6 ratings blank. This never happened. 
A 2 X 2 mixed ANOVA was used (with condition as a between-subjects 
factor and word type as a within-subjects factor) to analyze the time subjects 
took to complete the pleasantness and method of loci tasks. Subjects took 
longer to complete the method of loci task than to make the pleasantness 
ratings, Ms = 21.6 s vs 5.1 s per word, F(1, 152) = 118.34, ɳ2 = .44, p < .001. 
Reaction times for animate and inanimate words were similar, Ms = 13.5 s vs 
13.2, F(1, 152) = 0.27, ɳ2 = .00, p = .61. There was no interaction, F(1, 152) = 
0.39, ɳ2 = .00, p = .53.   
Recall Performance 
Figure 1 shows the performance on the recall test. A 2 X 2 mixed 
ANOVA was used to analyze recall performance4. Overall, recall was higher in 
the method of loci condition, Ms = .68 vs .38, F(1, 152) = 99.30, ɳ2 = .40, p < 
.001, which demonstrated that a  brief period of instructions in the method of 
loci was sufficient to produce large mnemonic benefits. Additionally, animate 
																																																								
3 For example, for the word “violin” a subject wrote “concert” for the location and “Atlanta” for 
the image; for the word “soldier” the subject wrote “Afghanistan” for the location and “military” 
for the image.	
4	Due to the large range of subjects, age was entered as a covariate for all experiments, and 
the pattern of results was the same.  Also an analysis with gender as a between subjects factor 
indicated that there were no differences between genders so the results have been collapsed 
across this variable.  
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words were recalled more than inanimate words, Ms = .60 vs .45, F(1, 152) = 
124.60, ɳ2 = .45, p < .001. This advantage for animate words was quite robust: 
Out of 154 subjects, 112 recalled more animate words than inanimate words, 
24 recalled more inanimate than animate words, and 18 recalled the same 
amount of both words. However, these main effects were qualified by an 
interaction such that the animacy effect was smaller in the method of loci 
condition than in the pleasantness condition,	F(1, 152) = 18.89, p < 0.001. A 
post-hoc analysis indicated that the animacy effect persisted both in the 
method of loci, t(76) = 5.25, d = 0.60 [0.35, 0.84] and pleasantness condition, 
t(76) = 10.20, d = 1.16[0.87, 1.45].  
Reaction time data was not recorded for one subject in the method of 
loci condition, so the results are reported with 153 subjects. Because the 
method of loci provided subjects with an output strategy during retrieval (i.e., 
mentally retracing the path), it would be unsurprising if subjects spent less time 
per word during the recall in this condition. Indeed, this was the case: Subjects 
in the method of loci condition recalled words faster than did subjects in the 
pleasantness condition, M = 9.2 s vs 12.1 s per word, t(152) = 3.71, d = 0.60, 
95% CI [0.27, 0.92].   
Table 2 reports the average number of words recalled that were not on 
the list. The mean number of intrusions per subject was low for both groups, 
but overall, more intrusions occurred in the method of loci group (Ms = 0.64 vs 
0.47). Intrusions were further classified in two ways. First, when intruded words 
were a synonym of a list word (e.g. the subject recalled “dad” when the list 
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word was “father,” or “diary” instead of “journal”), the intrusion was labeled as a 
“synonym.” When the intruded word had no clear similarity to a list word, it was 
labeled as “other intrusions.” This was done because synonyms were fairly 
common in the method of loci group relative to the pleasantness group (Ms = 
0.47 vs 0.12). This is likely because subjects recalled images rather than the 
exact word, per se. The total number of intrusions is therefore the sum of both 
the synonyms and intrusions. Because the primary concern of this experiment 
was the mnemonic value of animacy, intrusions were further classified as either 
animate or inanimate5. To use the previous example of a subject who intruded 
“dad,” this synonym would be further categorized as an animate, as would the 
intrusion “frog.” Overall, the pattern of synonyms follows the pattern of recall 
performance: More animate than inanimate synonyms for list words were 
recalled in both the method of loci group (Ms = 0.35 vs 0.12) and pleasantness 
group (Ms = 0.09 vs 0.03). It is unsurprising that the pattern of results with 
these synonyms mirrors the pattern of results with the list words, given that 
they can be considered as words that were almost correctly recalled, but not 
quite. The pattern was reversed for other intrusions: More inanimate intrusions 
were recalled than animate intrusions in both the method of loci group (Ms = 
0.12 vs. 0.05) and pleasantness group (Ms = 0.23 vs 0.12). 
  
																																																								
5	Note that this analysis is independent of the within-subject independent variable because 
intrusions in a within-subjects design cannot be calculated along this variable.  
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Recall Output Order 
I also analyzed the organization of subjects’ recall responses. One goal 
was to measure whether subjects who used the method of loci relied on a 
temporal organization to recall the words. If the method of loci provided 
subjects with a temporal organization strategy during encoding and retrieval, 
then those subjects would likely have a higher-than-chance measure of 
temporal output order and also likely have a higher temporal measure than 
subjects in the pleasantness control condition. To measure temporal output 
order, I calculated input-output correspondence (Asch & Ebenholtz, 1962) and 
temporal factor (Polyn, Norman, & Kahana, 2009) for each subject. The Asch-
Ebenholtz input-output correspondence was calculated in the following way: 
Imagine that a student recalled, in order, words 1, 2, 8, 6, and 3 from the list. If 
neighboring words are considered as pairs, then the student recalled four pairs 
(1-2, 2-8, 8-6, 6-3). In this case, two of the four pairs (1-2 and 2-8) show the 
correct sequence, resulting in an overall proportion of correctly ordered words 
of 0.50 (chance performance). The temporal factor described by Polyn et al. 
also measures output order but it provides a more general temporal order by 
taking into account the temporal order of not only immediate neighboring words 
but also other nearby words.  
Overall, subjects who used the method of loci were more likely to recall 
the words in serial order relative to subjects who made pleasantness ratings. 
This was true when temporal order was measured using the Asch-Ebenholtz 
(1962) input output correspondence, Ms = 0.63 vs. 0.46, t(152) = 6.36, d = 
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1.02, 95% CI [0.69, 1.36], and the Polyn et al. temporal factor measure, Ms = 
0.65 vs. 0.57, t (152) = 2.57, d = 0.42, 95% CI [0.09, 0.74]. This suggests that 
subjects in the method of loci condition relied on temporal order more than did 
subjects in the pleasantness condition, whose serial output scores were around 
chance.   
These temporal measures also provided an opportunity to glimpse into 
whether subjects’ who recalled more animate than inanimate words relied more 
or less on serial order. First, I calculated the difference between the number of 
inanimate words from the number of animate words subjects recalled. This 
served as a measure of the subjects’ animacy effect. I then calculated the 
correlation of this difference with the subjects’ temporal score to determine the 
extent to which subjects who recalled more animate words depended on serial 
order. A large negative correlation would mean that subjects who 
demonstrated a larger animacy effect depended less on serial order. While 
there was no significant difference in the correlations for each group 
individually, when combined across both groups, the difference scores were 
negatively correlated with the input-output scores, r(151) = -.17, p = .03, and a 
non-significant trend with the temporal factor, r(151) = -.08, p = .35. In 
combination with the interaction that was observed in the recall performance, 
these data suggest that using temporal order as an output strategy may 
decrease the animacy effect.  
I also analyzed the semantic organization of subjects’ recall responses. 
This is of particular interest because it is possible that the animacy effect 
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occurs, at least in part, because subjects notice that animate words fall under a 
general category of “living things.” Knowing this category cue could then aid 
the retrieval of words in that category. If this were the case, I would expect 
subjects to cluster their recall around things with similar semantic features in 
both the method of loci and pleasantness conditions. To do this, I calculated 
the semantic factor for each subject. Semantic factor uses Latent Semantic 
Analysis (or LSA) to measure the relatedness of words. As with temporal 
factor, a semantic factor of .50 indicates chance semantic grouping Sederberg, 
Miller, Howard, & Kahana, 2010). The semantic factors for the method of loci 
and pleasantness conditions were not significantly different than chance (M = 
.50), M = .53, t(75) = 1.14, p =.26 and M =.51, t(76) = 1.97, p=.053 
respectively, which indicates no semantic grouping in either condition. This is 
unsurprising in the method of loci condition because subjects were instructed 
to mentally retrace their steps through their memory palace during recall and 
the results of the previous temporal analyses indicate that, for the most part, 
subjects did recall in order. In addition, in both conditions the animate words 
were carefully selected to belong to a matched number of categories as the 
inanimate words. The semantic factor calculated here provides additional 
evidence that animate objects were memorable because they were animate 
objects, not because of their membership in a category.  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the mnemonic advantage for 
animate words relative to inanimate words persisted when subjects used the 
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method of loci which relied on order information. However, the animacy effect 
in the method of loci was smaller relative to the pleasantness control condition 
which did not rely on order. This may have occurred because animate objects 
are more memorable on an item-level at the cost of order information. The 
negative correlation between the difference scores and temporal output scores 
provide similar evidence: Subjects who had a larger animacy effect relied less 
on temporal order. The correlation was small and is not causal but shows the 
same pattern as the interaction between the animacy effect and condition 
(method of loci versus pleasantness ratings).   
The results of Experiment 1 also highlight the mnemonic value of the 
method of loci. Overall, subjects who used the method of loci recalled almost 
twice as many words as subjects in the pleasantness condition (Ms = .68 vs. 
.38). One subject who used the method of loci recalled all 30 words on the list. 
By contrast the highest scoring subject in the pleasantness condition recalled 
only 25 words. It is interesting to note that this high level of performance was 
achieved with minimal instructions. Given the range of training techniques and 
instructions provided to subjects in previous studies involving method of loci, it 
is useful to know that subjects can learn to use the method after only a brief 
period of instructions. The results of this experiment suggest that extensive 
training is not required in order to experience mnemonic benefits of the method 
of loci. Experiment 2 was carried out as a further investigation of animacy 











In Experiment 1, animate words were remembered better than 
inanimate words, even when the words were used in an ordered task such as 
the method of loci. Do animate images show the same pattern? To borrow an 
example from Joshua Foer, does imagining the wine bottles as living beings, 
talking amongst themselves make the wine bottles more memorable? To 
examine this, subjects in Experiment 2 saw only inanimate words and were 
either given the same instructions for the method of loci as in Experiment 1 (the 
inanimate control condition) or they were explicitly told to create animate 
images (e.g., “is laughing”) of the otherwise inanimate objects (e.g., “coin”). It is 
noteworthy that by doing this, subjects in both conditions viewed the exact 
same stimuli. The difference, then, was in how the words were processed (as 
animates or inanimates). Because the animacy manipulation occurred in the 
instructions, the most straightforward approach was to use a between-subjects 
design. This allowed me to keep all other aspects of Experiment 2 the same. 
That is, subjects were given one set of instructions at the onset of the 
experiment and they were uninterrupted while they created their memory 
palaces. I predicted Joshua Foer and other memory athletes were correct: 
creating animate images would produce a memory boost. Therefore, I 
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predicted that subjects who created animate images would recall more words 
than subjects who did not create animate images.  
Method 
Subjects 
One hundred and twenty subjects (52 female, 62 male, and 6 people 
who did not identify their gender) were recruited online via a Human 
Intelligence Task (HIT) posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. An additional 6 
subjects were tested and excluded for the following reasons: 1 subject 
completed the experiment on a smartphone, 3 subjects reported computer/user 
errors, and 2 subjects were determined to be completely off task which 
included responding to words with memories from childhood or writing various 
locations across the world. None of the subjects in Experiment 2 had 
participated in Experiment 1. The mean age of the subjects was 33.9 years 
(SD = 10.0, range = 20-74). The demographic information collection, post 
survey questionnaire, and worker restrictions used in Experiment 2 were the 
same as Experiment 1 (see Table 1). Subjects were paid $2.00 to complete the 
task, which lasted about 20 – 25 min.  
Design 
This experiment used a between-subjects design with two conditions: 
animate and inanimate imagery. There were 60 subjects in each condition. The 





Thirty unrelated, inanimate nouns (e.g., “coin,” “diamond”) were drawn 
from the extended Pavio norms (Clark & Pavio, 2004). All words were between 
three and seven letters long and were high in concreteness (M = 6.90), 
familiarity (M = 6.13), and imagery (M = 6.54). For a list of words used in 
Experiment 2, see Appendix C.  
Procedure 
The method of loci procedure from Experiment 1 was the same in 
Experiment 2 with the exception that subjects in the animacy condition were 
specifically told to imagine that the objects were alive. As in Experiment 1, 
subjects were given two examples. In the inanimate condition the examples 
were the same as Experiment 1 (e.g., “imagine that the PEACH is so large that 
it is blocking you from the driveway”). However, in the animate condition the 
examples included features of animate objects (e.g., “imagine that the PEACH 
is angrily trying to block you from the driveway”). Subjects spent an average of 
13.2 min in total for this task. Subjects were then given 4 min to recall the 
words.  
Results 
Initial Method of Loci Performance 
Using the same criteria as Experiment 1, 2 out of 120 subjects were 
eliminated for freely associating random locations or memories rather than 
creating a path. Reaction times for animate and inanimate images were similar, 
Ms = 28.3 vs. 24.5 ms per word, t(118) = 1.17, d = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.57]. 
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Categorization of Animate Responses: How do Subjects Conceptualize 
Animacy?  
In this experiment subjects were asked to animate inanimate objects. It 
is therefore interesting to examine how subjects conceptualized animacy. What 
characteristics did subjects assign to the inanimate objects in order to animate 
them? Did subjects imagine the objects as self-propelled and with intentions? 
To do this, I determined whether certain animate characteristics were present 
in the images. The initial inspiration for these characteristics was drawn from 
the literature concerned with defining animacy, but I also created additional 
characteristics that did not easily fit into any previously nominalized 
characteristic of animacy. Each image response often had multiple 
characteristics. For example “playing a tuba” is an example of both self-
generated movement and human-like behavior.   
The top of Table 3 shows the animate characteristics that were given to 
animate the objects in order of most frequent to least frequent. The second 
column from the right also shows the proportion of responses that included a 
given characteristic. For example, the most common characteristic was self-
generated movement: The proportion of animate images that included self-
generated movement was 0.26. This means that about 1 out of every 4 images 
included this characteristic. Responses ranged from short one-word answers 
with only one animate characteristic such as “hiding” (in this case the animate 
characteristic is planning or pursuing a goal) to up to 5 characteristics in one 
response such as “On my bed, is a piece of burnt toast, with a scowling face, 
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thrashing around trying to get to sleep on my bed.” In this second case the 
animate characteristics include self-generated movement (thrashing around), 
human-like behavior/emotions (scowling), has a face, and has a goal (trying to 
sleep).  
Recall Performance 
Figure 2 shows performance on the immediate recall test. Overall, there 
was no clear benefit for processing words as animates over processing words 
as inanimates, Ms = 0.68 vs 0.67, t(118) = 0.33, d = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.42]. 
Reaction time data did not save for three subjects, so the results are reported 
with 117 subjects. Reaction times for animate and inanimate words were 
almost identical, Ms = 9.7 vs. 9.6 s per word, t(115) = 0.003, d = 0.00, 95% CI 
[-0.36, 0.37]. 
Table 4 reports the average number of words that were recalled that 
were not on the list. All of the intrusions were inanimate objects. The mean 
number of intrusions per subject was low for both groups, but overall more 
intrusions occurred in the animate group than inanimate group (Ms = 0.70 vs 
0.55). Intrusions were again further classified into synonyms and other 
intrusions as in Experiment 1. Overall, the pattern of synonyms followed the 
pattern of recall performance: There was no difference between the number of 
synonyms recalled in the animate group compared to the inanimate group (Ms 
= 0.35 vs 0.32). The pattern was similar for other intrusions: Although very 
small, subjects in the animate group intruded slightly more than subjects in the 
inanimate group (Ms = 0.35 vs 0.23). 
54 
Recall Output Order 
The overall input-output correspondence and temporal factor in 
Experiment 2 were similar as Experiment 1 for both the animate and the 
inanimate conditions, (Input-output correspondence, Ms = 0.60 vs. .64; 
temporal factor, 0.67 vs. 0.68) which demonstrated that subjects were relying 
on some sort of temporal organization during retrieval. The semantic factor was 
around chance for both the animate and inanimate conditions, M = .54, t(59) = 
3.05, p = .003 and M = .54, t(59)= 4.96, p = .000, indicating that subjects may 
have relied on semantic categories during recall.   
Despite the instructions to animate the objects, not every image 
explicitly included animate characteristics. These responses were also coded 
and are represented in the bottom half of Table 3.  It is interesting to note that a 
large proportion of responses did not explicitly include animate characteristics 
(38%). Of the 60 subjects in the animate condition, 17 did not include any 
animate characteristics in their responses. Therefore, their responses make up 
14% of the 38% of inanimate responses which means that the remaining 21% 
percent of inanimate responses were from subjects who included a mix of 
animate and inanimate characteristics. It is difficult to know in these cases 
whether the animacy of the objects was implied in the subjects’ minds or 
whether the objects remained truly inanimate. For example, a subject wrote, 
“coffee spilling on the floor.” It is unclear what the cause of the spill is here. The 
coffee may have revolted against the mug and may be escaping to the floor or 
the coffee pot may have been unattended resulting in coffee dripping from a 
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pot into an overflowing mug and onto the floor. It is not possible to know from 
the brief descriptions. For this reason, I included all responses from subjects 
regardless of their inanimate characteristics.  
Additionally, an exploratory analysis was done to determine whether 
certain animate characteristics resulted in higher recall. It is possible that 
certain characteristics are stronger markers of animacy than other 
characteristics (such as self-generated movement) which may lead to higher 
levels of recall. The far right column of Table 3 shows the recall performance 
for words that were given the associated animate characteristics. Generally, 
the recall performance was consistent across characteristics, both animate and 
inanimate: Certain animate characteristics did not produce greater or worse 
memory for the associated word. I hesitate to draw strong conclusions about 
the recallability of certain animate characteristics because of the exploratory 
and conditional nature of this analysis (and the ambiguity of the actual image 
the subject created as in the case of the spilled coffee). It is possible that 
certain characteristics such as self-generated movement and pursuing a goal 
may be more memorable than other characteristics such as growing.   
In addition to analyzing the type of characteristic, another analysis was 
aimed at exploring recall differences based on the number of characteristics. 
Perhaps the animate words in Experiment 1 readily brought to mind an array of 
animate characteristics whereas the images subjects created in Experiment 2 
could bring to mind only a limited number of characteristics. For example, for 
the animate word “judge,” there is an array of animate characteristics that could 
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easily come to mind. We know that judges can walk on their own, use 
language, have emotions, have faces, were once children (and therefore 
grow), have wishes, and desires, etc. When subjects are tasked with animating 
a word with only a single phrase, such as “bouncing on the walls,” the number 
of animate characteristics – and inferences about what that object may do – is 
limited. In this example, perhaps the only animate characteristic is self-
generated movement. Likewise, the phrase mentioned previously about the 
thrashing burnt toast contains 5 characteristics. In the present experiment, a 
logistic regression analysis was used to predict recall using the number of 
animate characteristics associated with each word as predictors. The number 
of characteristics was not a significant predictor (chi squared = 0.82, p = .37 
with df = 1). The EXP(B) value indicated that for every additional animate 
characteristic subjects included, subjects were no more likely to recall the 
associated word, EXP(B) = 0.92, or 0.92 times as likely. As with the type of 
animate characteristic, the number of characteristics may be related to an 
item’s recallability, but these differences are not detectable under the 
conditions of this experiment.  
Bizarre and Imagery Ratings 
In this experiment subjects were asked to take inanimate objects and 
either transform them into animate objects or keep them inanimate. In the first 
situation, it is reasonable to expect that the resulting image would be more 
bizarre or difficult to imagine. In typical free recall experiments, bizarre imagers 
are more memorable than ordinary images, but only in mixed list designs.  
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To obtain bizarreness and imagery ratings, 52 Mechanical Turk workers 
who had not participated in Experiment 2 rated how normal or bizarre the 
images were; 52 different subjects rated how difficult or easy it was to create 
an image of the word-image pairs. Because the current experiment was 
between subjects, half of the subjects in each group rated the images from the 
animate condition and the other half rated images from the inanimate 
conditions. Rating all possible word and image combinations (3600 images in 
total) was not practical so a random subset of 50 of the pairs was selected for 
each subject. Subjects saw the word and image phrase (e.g., “DOLLAR: 
Resting and snoring”) and were asked to rate how bizarre each image was on 
a scale of 1-5 where 1 was very normal and 5 was very bizarre. Subjects who 
made imagery ratings were asked to rate how difficult or easy it was to create 
an image in which 1 was very difficult to image and 5 was very easy to image. 
Ratings were self-paced and subjects were instructed to make the ratings 
based only on the image and not on grammatical errors.  
As expected, the images created in the animate condition were rated as 
more bizarre than the images created in the inanimate condition, Ms = 3.28 vs. 
2.63, t(50) = 6.38, d = 1.77 95%CI [1.12, 2.41]. Animate images were also 
rated as more difficult to image than the images created in the inanimate 
condition, Ms = 2.88 vs. 3.62, t(50) = 5.90, d = 1.70 95%CI [1.04, 2.35]. This is 
unsurprising given that bizarre images tend to be more difficult to imagine 




When subjects were asked to process objects as either animate or 
inanimate in a between-subjects design, there was no animacy effect. There 
are several possible explanations for why this may be the case. The first 
possibility is that animacy effects are only found with animate and inanimate 
words.   VanArsdall et al. (2013) demonstrated the animacy effect with 
nonwords that were paired with phrase. In that case, nonwords had no prior 
characteristics, animate or inanimate. In the current experiment, all words were 
inanimate and half of the subjects were asked to add animate characteristics to 
inanimate words. Perhaps the inanimate characteristics of the words cannot be 
“overridden” with animate images. This seems unlikely given the pervasiveness 
of animated inanimate objects in everyday life (e.g., the examples from earlier 
such as Mrs. Pots from Beauty and the Beast). A related possible explanation 
is that this task was too difficult for subjects to do. Perhaps it was too difficult to 
create both 30 unique locations and also 30 examples of animate images. 
Possible evidence for this is that 38% of images did not explicitly contain 
animate imagery. In Experiment 3, I avoided this by providing subjects with the 
images. A third possible explanation is that the animacy effect does not appear 
in between-subjects designs. To my knowledge, there have been no between-
subjects manipulations of animacy. In Experiment 3, I returned to a within-
subjects design.  
In Experiment 2, subjects were asked to create animate images of 
inanimate objects, resulting in a rather large list of animate images. These 
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images provide a starting point for an empirical classification system of animate 
characteristics. Of particular interest was the frequency with which subjects 
attributed animacy to objects by including self-generated movement. Self-
generated movement is generally considered one of the primary dynamic cues 
of animacy and may be the characteristic that comes to mind most easily. At 
this point, any conclusions based on this experiment are speculation. 
Additional, controlled experiments aimed specifically at examining this issue 
are needed.  
This experiment also provided additional information about the method 
of loci. As in Experiment 1, the method of loci was an effective mnemonic 
strategy despite minimal instructions. With no extensive training on the method 
or additional study, subjects recalled on average 20 out of 30 words. The 
results from Experiment 2 also shed light on existing speculation regarding the 
use of bizarre images in the method of loci. Frequent users of the method often 
promote creating bizarre images to facilitate later recall, yet this experiment 
suggests that turning every image on a list into a bizarre one will not provide a 
mnemonic benefit.  
Experiment 3 was designed to continue investigating the mnemonic 
effects of animate images of inanimate words using the method of loci. In this 
experiment, images were provided to subjects and were presented in a mixed 
list resulting in a within-subjects design. Providing subjects with the images 











In the second experiment, the task of animating objects was up to the 
subjects and was carried out in a between-subjects design to keep the task 
straightforward and the instructions consistent for each subject (i.e., subjects 
either received the special instructions to animate the objects or they did not). 
However, 38% of the images subjects created in the animate condition did not 
explicitly contain animate characteristics. Although these words were not 
recalled any differently than images that did explicitly contain animate 
characteristics, a goal of Experiment 3 was to remove this ambiguity by pairing 
words with predetermined images that were either animate or inanimate. By 
providing subjects with the images, I was also able to reintroduce a within 
subjects design. In the current experiment, subjects were again instructed to 
mentally place the target words along a path such as a childhood home. 
However, unlike the previous experiments, I provided the images, half of which 
were animate (e.g., “playing tennis”) and half of which were inanimate (e.g., 
“made of wood”). Subjects were told to imagine the object and create a location 
for it along their path. I predicted that providing subjects with images that are 
clearly either animate or inanimate and returning to a within subjects design 




Sixty subjects (32 female, 24 male, and 4 people who did not identify 
their gender) were recruited online via a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) posted 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. An additional 2 subjects were tested and 
excluded from the experiment because 1 subject reported computer/user 
errors, and 1 subject was determined to be completely off task, which included 
freely associating words to writing various locations across the world. None of 
the subjects in Experiment 3 had participated in either Experiment 1 or 2. The 
mean age of the subjects was 36.9 years (SD = 11.6, range = 19 - 65). The 
same demographic information collection, post survey questionnaire and 
worker restrictions from Experiments 1 and 2 applied in Experiment 3 (see 
Table 1). Subjects were paid $2.00 to complete the task, which lasted about 25 
min.  
Design 
This experiment used a within-subjects design with two conditions: 
animate and inanimate imagery. Half of the words from the list were paired with 
animate images (e.g.,  “playing tennis”) and the other half were paired with 
inanimate images (e.g., “made of wood”). Image and word pairings were 
counterbalanced such that each word was paired with an animate image in one 
version and an inanimate image in another. The number of words recalled on 




The same words in Experiment 2 were used in Experiment 3 with 4 
exceptions: The words apple, flower, lemon, and potato were removed 
because, although not animate, they are living things. The replacement words 
were also drawn from the extended Pavio norms (Clark & Pavio, 2004). All 
words were between three and seven letters long and were high in 
concreteness (M = 6.90), familiarity (M = 6.13), and imagery (M = 6.54). For a 
list of words and images used in Experiment 3, see Appendix C.  
Procedure 
The method of loci procedure of Experiment 1 was the same in 
Experiment 3 with the main exception that subjects were given an image rather 
than creating one themselves. In addition, Experiment 3 instructions were 
modified to reduce the number of people who did not create a clear path. Also, 
pilot data suggested that recall performance and output order were quite low 
when subjects were instructed to write only the locations of the images along 
their path. These pilot subjects reported focusing on identifying 30 locations in 
their house rather than imagining placing the objects in those locations. 
Therefore, the instructions in Experiment 3 were modified to emphasize that 
the goal of the task was to imagine the given object interacting with the 
subjects’ chosen location. The instructions also emphasized the importance of 
creating a path.  See Appendix D for the complete instructions. Subjects spent 
on average 9.0 min in total for this task. Subjects were then given 4 min to 
recall the words. 
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Results 
Initial Method of Loci Performance 
Reaction times for animate and inanimate words were similar, Ms = 9.3 
s vs. 8.8 s per word, t(59) = 1.79, d = 0.23, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.49]. 
Recall Performance 
Figure 3 shows performance on the immediate recall test. Overall, there 
was a numerical benefit for processing words as animates over processing 
words as inanimates, Ms = 0.50 vs 0.46, t(59) = 1.54, d = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.06, 
0.45], although this was not statistically significant.  
All the intrusions, except for 2 words, were inanimate objects. The mean 
number of intrusions was higher in this experiment (M = 1.03 intrusions per 
subjects), but it was rare that subjects recalled a synonym of a word in place of 
the actual word (M = 0.08 words per subject). 
As in Experiment 2, another analysis was aimed at exploring recall 
differences based on the number of animate characteristics of the images. 
However, in the present experiment each subject did not create their own 
animate images, but rather all subjects viewed the same 30 images, 15 of 
which were animate. In the absence of a standardized norm of animate 
characteristics, I used the same category of characteristics that were present in 
the 1800 responses in Experiment 2 (listed in Table 2) to quantify the number 
of animate characteristics of the images in Experiment 3. I then correlated the 
average recall for the words associated with the 15 animate images with the 
number of characteristics of the images. An increase in number of categories 
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was associated with an increase in recall performance, but the result was not 
significant r(14) = .23, p = .40.  
Recall Output Order 
The overall input-output correspondence and temporal factor in 
Experiment 3 were similar as previous experiments, (Ms = 0.68, 0.65, 
respectively) which demonstrate that subjects were indeed relying on some 
sort of temporal organization during retrieval. The within-subject design allowed 
me to perform an analysis similar to Experiment 1 to determine whether 
subjects who recalled more animate than inanimate words relied more or less 
on serial order. A large negative correlation between the subjects’ difference 
scores and temporal scores would mean that subjects who demonstrated a 
larger animacy effect depended less on serial order. As in previous 
experiments, there were nonsignificant negative correlations with the Asch-
Ebenholtz input-output correlation, r(59)= -.24, p = .07 and the Polyn temporal 
factor, r(59) = -.18, p = .18. In combination with results from Experiment 1, 
these data suggest that using a temporal order may decrease the animacy 
effect. As in previous experiments, the semantic factor was not statistically 
different than chance, M = .48, t(59) = 0.97, p = .34, indicating that subjects 
likely did not rely on animacy as a category cue during recall.   
Bizarre Ratings 
In Experiment 2 subjects created their own animate images which were 
later rated as more bizarre and more difficult to imagine than inanimate 
images. In the current Experiment, I created fixed images for subjects. To 
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assess how bizarre and easy to imagine the images were, 60 subjects who had 
not participated in Experiment 3 rated the bizarreness of the word-image pairs 
and a separate 60 subjects rated the imagability of the word pairs. Each 
subject rated all 30 words from either counterbalanced version. The rating 
procedures were identical to Experiment 2. In typical free recall experiments, 
bizarre images are more memorable than ordinary images, but only in mixed 
list designs. However, in this experiment subjects were given a retrieval 
strategy during encoding and retrieval and the subject was tasked with 
retrieving the specific item. The prevailing explanation for the bizarreness effect 
is that bizarre images enhance the retrievability of the specific item but not the 
accessibility or discriminability of the individual items within the image 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). If that is the case, then it would be surprising if 
bizarreness affected recallability of the words within the method of loci.   
As in Experiment 2, the images created in the animate condition were 
rated as more bizarre than the images created in the inanimate condition, Ms = 
3.83 vs. 2.89, t(59) = 7.37, d = 0.95, 95%CI [0.64, 1.25]. The reverse pattern 
was found for imagery ratings: The animate images were rated as more difficult 
to imagine than the images in the inanimate condition, Ms = 2.57 vs. 3.76, t(59) 
= 11.12, d = 1.43 95%CI [1.07, 1.79].  
Discussion 
In Experiment 3 subjects were given a mixed list of animate and 
inanimate descriptions of objects and were asked to use the method of loci to 
place the objects. In this within-subjects design, subjects recalled numerically 
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more words associated with animate images than words associated with 
inanimate images, yet this difference was not statistically significant. When 
imagery was used to manipulate animacy, the animacy effect persisted. This 
experiment also provides additional evidence that the animacy effect may be 
decreased when subjects’ encoding strategy is restricted. Correlations between 
subjects’ difference scores and output order were negative which suggests that 
subjects who relied more on a temporal output order during retrieval had a 
smaller animacy effect.  
Objects associated with more animate characteristics may be more 
memorable than objects associated with less animate characteristics, but these 
differences were not detectable in this experiment, nor was this experiment 
designed to detect such a difference. However, the results of the current 
experiment trend in that direction.  In fact, the phrase associated with the 
highest recall (“crying because she is lonely”) had the highest number of 
animate characteristics (4) and the phrase associated with the lowest recall 
(“running in circles”) had only 1 characteristic.  
The bizarre and imagery ratings from Experiment 3 replicated the 
pattern found in Experiment 2. On one hand, bizarre images are typically 
recalled more than ordinary objects in a mixed-list, free recall design. On the 
other hand, imagability is another dimension that is considered one of best 
predictors of recall performance (Rubin and Friendly, 1986). In the present 
experiment, animate objects were both more bizarre and more difficult to 
imagine.  
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The results of Experiment 3 also allow for a brief comment about the 
method of loci as a mnemonic tool. Looking across the free recall data from all 
three experiments, the method of loci was less effective when subjects were 
given the images and only asked to create locations. It is possible that part of 
the benefit of the method of loci comes from creating images of the to-be-
remembered words.  
Thus far, I have reported one experiment (Experiment 1) that 
demonstrated the potent value of animacy as a mnemonic variable and two 
experiments that provided weak evidence (Experiment 3) to no evidence 
(Experiment 2) of the mnemonic value of pairing inanimate words with animate 
images. Across these experiments, I have examined word type (animate vs. 
inanimate) without directly stating the type of image that should be created, 
and I have examined image type (animate vs. inanimate) with only inanimate 
words. Experiment 4 was carried out as a further investigation of the 
animate/inanimate word-image conditions previously used and also included a 
fourth condition (animate words paired with inanimate images) that has not yet 











In Experiment 4, I first sought to conceptually replicate the effect of 
animate words found in Experiment 1 and the smaller effect of animate images 
found in Experiment 3. In addition, the previous experiments (Experiments 2 
and 3) were concerned with the mnemonic benefits of adding animate 
characteristics to inanimate words. In Experiment 4, I added a condition to 
examine the mnemonic effects of removing animate characteristics from 
animate words (see Figure 4 for an example from each condition). Specifically, 
in this condition I paired animate words with inanimate images. Thus in 
Experiment 4, I factorially crossed word type (animate vs. inanimate) with 
image type (animate vs. inanimate).  The procedure was identical to 
Experiment 3: I provided subjects with images, half of which were animate and 
half of which were inanimate. In contrast to Experiment 3, half of the 
associated words were animate words and the other half were inanimate 
words. Subjects were again told to image the word and associated 
characteristic and to imagine placing the image along a path. Based on the 
results from the previous experiments, I predicted a main effect of word and 
image type such that more animate words and words that were paired with 
animate images would be recalled than inanimate words and words paired with 
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inanimate images. However, based on the results of Experiment 3, I predicted 
that the effect of image type would be smaller than the effect of word type.   
Method 
Subjects 
To determine the number of subjects, I performed a power analysis6 
with the effect size from Experiment 3. Two hundred subjects (117 female, 77 
male, and 6 people who did not identify their gender/reported “other”) were 
recruited online via a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) posted on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. An additional 33 subjects were tested and excluded for the 
following reasons: 2 subjects indicated cheating on the task, 1 subject left more 
than 6 study response blank, 3 indicated using a smartphone, 9 subjects 
reported computer/user errors, and 18 did not comply with instructions during 
the method of loci task (1 subject retyped the word instead of creating an 
image, 16 subjects were determined to be completely off task which included 
responding to words with various locations across the world or putting all of the 
words in the same location, and 1 subject reported being distracted by the TV 
during the experiment and failed to understand the instructions). None of the 
subjects in Experiment 4 had participated in the previous experiments. The 
mean age of the subjects was 35.0 years (SD = 10.8, range = 19 - 67). The 
same demographic information collection, post survey questionnaire and 
worker restrictions from previous experiments were used (see Table 1). 
																																																								
6	Experiment 3 was chosen for the power analysis here because Experiment 4 contains a 
direct replication of Experiment 3.			
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Design 
A 2 (word type: animate vs. inanimate) X 2 (image type: animate vs. 
inanimate) within-subjects design was used. Half of the words from the list 
were paired with animate images (e.g., “trying to escape”) and the other half 
were paired with inanimate images (e.g., “made of chocolate”). In addition, half 
of the words were animate (e.g., “father”) and half were inanimate (e.g., “kite”). 
There were 7 words in each of the 4 word-image conditions: (a) animate-
word/animate-image, (b) animate-word/inanimate-image, (c) inanimate-
word/animate-image, and (d) inanimate-word/inanimate-image. (See Figure 4 
for the design and an example word-image pair for each condition.) Image and 
word pairings were counterbalanced such that each word was paired with an 
animate image in one counterbalance version and an inanimate image in 
another. The number of words recalled on an immediate recall test was the 
dependent variable.  
Materials 
Twenty-eight of the 30 words used in Experiment 1 were selected for 
Experiment 4. This was done to create an equal number of words per 
condition. For a list of words and images used in Experiment 4, see Appendix 
C. Prior to Experiment 4, several pilot studies were done to create a set of 
materials that had more similar bizarreness and imagery ratings than in 
Experiment 3. The rating results from the 40 subjects who rated the 
bizarreness (20 per version) and the 40 subjects who rated the imagery (20 per 
version) are reported in Table 5.  
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Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 3 with the exception that the 
materials were different. Subjects spent on average 7.9 min in total for this 
task. Subjects were given 4 min to recall the words. 
Results 
Initial Method of Loci Performance 
A 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze the reaction 
time. Subjects were faster at creating the location for animate words relative to 
inanimate words, Ms = 16290 vs 17417, F(1, 196) = 4.03, ɳ2 = .02, p = .05. 
Reaction times for animate and inanimate images were almost the same, Ms = 
16.4 s vs 17.2 s, F(1, 196) = 1.21, ɳ2 = .01, p = .27. There was no interaction, 
F(1, 196) = 1.10, ɳ2 = .01, p = .30.   
Final Recall Performance 
Figure 5 shows the performance on the immediate recall test. A 2 X 2 
repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze recall performance. Overall 
there was a main effect of word type, Ms = .54 vs .48, F(1, 199) = 21.27, ɳ2 = 
.10, p < .001, and image type, Ms = .52 vs .49, F(1, 199) = 7.31, ɳ2 = .04, p = 
.007, such that animate images were recalled better than inanimate images. 
There was no interaction, F(1, 199) = 0.20, ɳ2 = .00, p = .66, indicating that the 
effect of animate images did not differ when the images were paired with 
animate words versus inanimate words.  
Table 6 reports the average number of words recalled that were not on 
the list. The mean number of intrusions was higher in Experiment 4 (M = 1.42 
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intrusions per subject) than in previous experiments. More inanimate words 
were intruded than animate words, M = 0.90 vs. M = 0.54. The majority of 
intrusions were images (e.g., the subject recalled “chocolate”) most of which 
were inanimate images, M = 0.55, whereas less were animate images, M = 
0.06. Intrusions were further classified as synonyms of target words. Overall, 
the pattern of these synonym intrusions followed the pattern of recall 
performance: More animate synonyms were intruded than inanimate 
synonyms, M = 0.18 vs. 0.10, and more synonyms associated with animate 
images were intruded than synonyms associated with inanimate phrases, M = 
0.17 vs. M = 0.11). In sum the higher intrusion rates in Experiment 4 were likely 
due to a large number of image intrusions, the majority of which were 
unexpectedly inanimate intrusions. Unsurprisingly, the intrusion pattern of 
synonyms of target words followed the same pattern as the target word recall 
performance.    
Recall differences were again examined based on the number of 
animate characteristics, collapsed across word type, of the images with a 
correlation. However in this experiment, there was no relation between recall 
and number of characteristics. If anything, an increase in number of categories 
was associated with a slight decrease in recall performance, r(13) = -.15, p = 
.61.  
Bizarre/Imagery Ratings 
The words and images used in Experiment 4 were rated in advance to 
equate bizarreness and imagery across conditions. However, because there 
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were still small differences across conditions, these variables were correlated 
with the average recall score for each word-image pair. There was a weak, 
non-significant correlation between bizarre ratings and recall such that word-
image pairs that were rated as more bizarre were recalled less than words that 
were rated as ordinary, r(54) = -0.06, p =.65. There was also a negative, yet 
insignificant, correlation between image ratings and recall such that word-
image pairs that were rated as easier to image were recalled more than words 
that were more difficult to image, r(54) = -0.15, p =.26. Bizarre imagery was not 
associated with higher recall performance.  
Recall Output Order 
The overall input-output correspondence and temporal factor in 
Experiment 4 were similar as previous experiments, (Ms = 0.66, 0.69) which 
demonstrates that subjects were indeed relying on some sort of temporal 
organization during retrieval. While there were no significant correlations 
between the difference between animate and inanimate recall scores and the 
output orders, there was a consistent negative trend for both words (Asch-
Ebenholtz: r = -0.05, p = .16; Temporal Factor: -0.05, p = .15) and images 
(Asch-Ebenholt: r = -0.09, p = .19 Temporal Factor: -0.12, p = .08). In 
combination with results from Experiments 1 and 3, these data suggest that 
using a temporal order may decrease the animacy effect, although this was a 
very small effect. As in the previous experiments, the semantic factor was at 
chance, M = .50, t(196) = .353, p = .73, indicating subjects did not cluster their 
recall responses based on semantic relatedness.  
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 replicate the findings from Experiment 3 
with inanimate words and extended the findings to include animate words. In 
Experiment 4 subjects used the method of loci to learn a mixed list of animate 
and inanimate words that were paired with either animate or inanimate images. 
Subjects recalled more animate than inanimate words and recalled more words 
that were paired with animate images than with inanimate images.  
The results showed that manipulating the animacy of target words 
produced a larger animacy effect than did manipulating the animacy of images. 
When subjects processed an animate object as something that was inanimate 
(e.g., “A minister sketched in pencil hangs over the doorway”) the animacy 
characteristics still persisted. These objects were remembered just as well, 
numerically even a bit better, than inanimate objects that acted like animates 
(e.g., “The drum dances to its own beat in the shower”). 
There was no obvious relationship between the number of animate 
characteristics associated with each phrase and the recallability of the words 
paired with those phrases. In fact, the phrase associated with the highest recall 
(“trying to escape”) only had 1 animate characteristic whereas the phrase 
associated with the lowest and second lowest recall (“dancing to music” and 
“singing a song”) had 2 and 3 characteristics, respectively.  
These data also provide additional insights into the usefulness of the 
method of loci as a mnemonic device. The results provide support for the idea 
expressed in Experiment 3 that the method of loci is more effective when 
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people create their own images than when people are given images.  In 
Experiment 4, subjects recalled on average 51% (roughly 14 out of 28) words 
whereas in Experiment 1, in which subjects were to create images however 
they chose, subjects who used the method of loci recalled 68% (roughly 20 out 
of 30) words. In addition to lower levels of recall performance, subjects in 
Experiment 4 had higher intrusion rates and reported that it was difficult to 
keep the images and words straight or that they focused too much on creating 
location. One subject said, “I can remember something was writing a novel at 
the kitchen table but not what exactly. Maybe it was a dove?” (It was not). Here 
the subject successfully recalled part of the image (“writing a novel”), but failed 
to remember the rest of the image (the target word “pencil”). Another subject 
reported a similar confusion that was caused by the images, “I think if it wasn't 
for the phrases, I would've been able to remember many more words.” Another 
concluded, “If I do this type of thing again, I will ignore any given extra info and 













The reported experiments used the method of loci to explore the 
mnemonic effects of animacy. The method of loci provided a salient 
organizational strategy during encoding that was available again during 
retrieval. As a result, output strategy was held constant across subjects so that 
the recall test was a relatively pure measure of item information. In Experiment 
1, memory for animate and inanimate words was tested in either the method of 
loci or a pleasantness ratings control condition. Subjects learned a list of 
words; half of the words were animate and the other half were inanimate. 
Subjects in both conditions recalled more animate than inanimate words. 
However, the animacy effect in the method of loci was smaller relative to the 
pleasantness condition. These results demonstrated that the animacy effect 
was smaller when subjects were given an ordered encoding and retrieval 
structure, but animacy is still a potent variable in memory. In addition, subjects 
in the method of loci condition recalled more words than did subjects in the 
pleasantness control condition. Note the magnitude of this effect was rather 
large, d = 1.60, 95%CI [1.24, 1.97].  
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether the animacy effect persisted 
when inanimate words were imagined as animate. All subjects were given a list 
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of inanimate words. In the animate condition, subjects were told to imagine the 
object was alive. In the inanimate condition, subjects were given no additional 
instructions. In this between-subject design, there was no animacy effect.  It is 
unclear why there was no animacy effect in this experiment. Some possible 
explanations include the between-subjects design, the difficulty of the task, or 
the possibility that the animacy effect is limited to animate words and does not 
extend to animate images. Given the results of the third and fourth 
experiments, this last possibility is unlikely. These explanations will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
In Experiment 3, subjects saw inanimate words paired with 
experimenter-generated images, half of which were animate and half of which 
were inanimate. Subjects recalled numerically more words that were paired 
with animate images than words that were paired with inanimate images, 
although this effect was not statistically significant. A replication of Experiment 
3 with more subjects was carried out in Experiment 4. In addition, I added a 
condition to examine the mnemonic effects of removing animate characteristics 
from animate words by pairing animate words with inanimate images. Thus, in 
Experiment 4, I factorially crossed word type (animate vs. inanimate) with 
image type (animate vs. inanimate). There was a main effect of both word type 
and image type such that animate words were recalled more than inanimate 
words (as in Experiment 1) and words associated with animate images were 
recalled more than words associated with inanimate images (as in Experiment 
3). The results of Experiment 4 demonstrate that imagining objects as 
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animates, even if they are inanimate objects, produced an animacy effect. 
Likewise, imagining animate objects as inanimate reduced the mnemonic value 
of that word.  
Why was there no advantage for animate imagery in Experiment 2? The 
first obvious difference between Experiment 2 and Experiments 3 and 4 was 
the use of a between-subjects design. To my knowledge, animacy effects have 
yet to be seen in a pure list, between-subjects design. Certain memory 
phenomena, such as the bizarreness or generation effects mentioned in this 
manuscript, are only observed in mixed-list designs. It is possible that animacy 
is another phenomenon that is only found in a mixed-list design. The 
bizarreness and generation effects are thought to occur only in mixed list 
designs because they either enhance the retrievability of the item at the cost of 
the memory for the specific item or vice versa. In the generation effect, words 
that are generated are presumably recalled more because those individual 
words become more memorable at the cost of memory for the order 
information. In a mixed-list, the order information of the restudied words is also 
impaired due to the presence of the generated words within the list. In this 
case, the order of both the generated and restudied words is impaired. In a 
pure-list design, generating the words improves the item memory for the words 
but impairs the order information. Restudying the words does not provide the 
extra mnemonic boost at the individual item level, but it also does not impair 
the order memory for the words, either. Thus, no generation effect is found in a 
pure-list design (Nairne et al., 1991). Bizarreness is thought to improve 
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memory for the opposite reasons. Words that are more bizarre are thought to 
improve the retrievability of item at the cost of the memory for the specific item 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). Perhaps animacy is another phenomenon that 
does not appear in a pure list design.  
Another explanation of the null results in Experiment 2 is that the 
animacy effect is not found with animate images of inanimate words. Across 
three experiments, images were used to manipulate the animacy of objects 
and Experiment 2 was the only experiment in which no effect was found 
although in Experiment 4, the effect of imagery, d = .19, 95% CI [0.05, 0.33], 
was smaller than the effect of animate words, d = .33, 95% CI [0.19, 0.47]. In 
Experiment 2 a large proportion of animate images did not explicitly contain 
animate imagery. Perhaps the combination of an already small imagery effect 
and a large proportion of inanimate images included in the animate imagery 
condition were sufficient to eliminate the animacy effect. Perhaps subjects in 
Experiment 2 needed additional instructions or examples to learn how to use 
the method of loci and create images a specific way.  
In Experiment 4, creating animate images produced an animacy effect, 
but this effect was smaller than the effect with animate words. When words 
were paired with animate images, they were recalled more than when they 
were paired with inanimate images and vice versa. It appears as though pairing 
an animate word with an inanimate phrase reduced the mnemonic value of that 
word relative to pairing the same word with an animate phrase. However, 
animate words that were paired with inanimate images were still recalled more 
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than inanimate words that were paired with animate images. There must be 
something about animate words that is innately more memorable that cannot 
be stripped away even if the animate characteristics of that word have been 
stripped away.  
Why was the animacy effect smaller with images relative to words? One 
idea may be related to the number of animate characteristics in the image. This 
is a possibility, but across all the experiment manipulating imagery type 
(Experiments 2 - 4) there was no consistent relationship between the number 
of animate characteristics associated with each phrase and the recallability of 
the words paired with those phrases. In Experiment 2 the phrase associated 
with the most characteristics, “crying because she is lonely”, was associated 
with the highest recalled word but in Experiment 2, the words associated with 
this phrase fell in the middle of the recall distribution. I think it is quite possible 
that, in a separate and controlled experiment designed specifically to explore 
this idea, objects with more animate characteristics or features may lead to 
better recall. Such an experiment might pair more images (along the magnitude 
of hundreds) that have been normed for the number of characteristics with 
inanimate objects that are then tested on a final recall test. It is quite possible 
that under these controlled and highly powered conditions, more animate 
characteristics would predict higher recall scores. However, this is not a pattern 
I have identified in the present experiments. Perhaps there are certain types of 
animacy cues that may be more memorable than other cues. The exploratory 
analysis in Experiment 2 did not reveal any support for this conclusion either, 
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but again, I hesitate to dismiss the idea based on a conditional analysis of an 
experiment with null results. 
What mechanisms underlie the animacy effect? It is most likely that 
animacy does not enhance exclusively item information or order information. 
One possible explanation was that animates may capture attention and be 
more memorable at the cost of the paired associate. The results of the present 
experiments do not provide conclusive evidence one way or the other. On one 
hand, these experiments provided a small amount of evidence that people with 
larger animacy effects relied less on order (as seen from the consistently 
negative correlations between subjects’ animacy effects and output order). This 
fits with the idea that animates may have captured attention at the cost of the 
associated location. During retrieval the locations associated with the animate 
objects could have been less available than the locations associated with the 
inanimate objects. This might explain the reduced output order for subjects with 
larger animacy effects. On the other hand, the animacy effect persisted in the 
method of loci, which means any impairment the location suffered was not 
enough to eliminate the animacy effect. Importantly, the fact that the animacy 
effect appeared in the method of loci at all suggests that the animacy effect is 
due, at least in part, to memory for the items. Whether animates affect the 
accessibility or order information of words is not fully known. The persistence of 
the animacy effect in the method of loci also suggests it is unlikely that the 
animacy effect occurs because subjects use “animate” and “inanimate” (or 
“living” and nonliving”) as category cues during retrieval.  
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Method of Loci 
The use of the method of loci throughout these experiments allows for 
some comments to be made about its effectiveness. While the primary goal of 
this dissertation was not to examine the effectiveness of the method of loci per 
se, there are several observations made across four experiments that are 
worth noting. First, subjects in the method of loci condition recalled almost 
twice as many words as subjects in the pleasantness control condition 
(Experiment 1). Of course, these results are confounded by the total time on 
task because subjects in the method of loci condition also spent about four 
times as long for the initial encoding task. Nevertheless, the method of loci 
produced impressive recall performance. Also, the goal of the present 
experiments was to examine differences in memory for animate versus 
inanimate objects. Therefore, I was not hoping for ceiling performance in the 
method of loci conditions so that differences in the variable of interest would be 
detectable. There are several changes that could be made that may boost 
performance. One such change is that subjects in the present experiments 
received relatively brief instructions. The memory athletes mentioned in this 
manuscript have spent months, if not years, developing their method of loci 
techniques. The subjects in this dissertation spent only minutes. Perhaps 
performance would have been higher had subjects been given additional 
instructions or practice opportunities. In previous studies examining the method 
of loci, subjects participated in an entire session devoted to creating a path for 
future use of the method. Currently, it is unknown whether a single session 
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would improve performance or not, but I suspect it might. Additionally, 
performance may improve if subjects are told explicitly to create an interactive 
image with the to-be-remembered object and the location. Preliminary pilot 
data suggest that this may improve performance. These interactive instructions 
were intentionally excluded in Experiments 1 and 2 to keep performance from 
ceiling.  
Looking across all four experiments, it appears that method of loci 
performance was best when subjects created their own images. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, subjects created their own images. In Experiments 3 and 
4, subjects viewed experimenter-created images. Comparing across these 
experiments, method of loci performance was about 15% - 20% higher when 
subjects created their own images. There were obvious differences across 
conditions besides whether or not subjects created their own imagery, but 
there are reasons to expect that self-generated images would be more 
memorable than experimenter-generated images. Worthen and Hunt (2011) 
reviewed several mnemonics and conclude that in general, self-generated 
mnemonics are more effective than other-generated mnemonics. Perhaps with 
additional training, people could learn to generate animate images themselves 
that would be particularly memorable.  
Finally, the results of these experiments do not provide overwhelming 
evidence that bizarreness provides a mnemonic boost in the method of loci. 
Bizarreness was not a factor of interest in these studies, but inanimate images 
that were animated were consistently rated as more bizarre. This provided an 
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opportunity to make some brief comments about bizarreness. In Experiment 2, 
there were clear differences in bizarreness between the animate and inanimate 
conditions yet no differences in performance. In Experiment 4, bizarreness 
differences were minimized relative to Experiment 3 yet the same pattern of 
recall was observed. It is unlikely that the animacy effect in these experiments 
was driven by bizarre imagery.   
Conclusion 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the animacy effect in 
the method of loci. Across four experiments, there was evidence that the 
animacy effect persisted in the method of loci both when animacy was 
manipulated by the words themselves and with the imagery associated with the 
words. However, the mnemonic effect of animacy was decreased in the 
method of loci relative to a control (Experiment 1). Also, the animacy effect was 
larger when the animacy manipulation occurred at the word level than when it 
occurred at the image level.  These results demonstrate that animacy is a 
potent variable in memory. 
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Average Number of Intrusions Per Subject in Experiment 1 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  Synonyms Intrusions 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 Animates Inanimates Animates Inanimates 
Method of Loci 0.35 0.12 0.05 0.12 
Pleasantness 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.23 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. “Synonyms” are intrusions that were synonyms from the to-be-
remembered list (e.g. “dad” when the list word was “father” or “diary” instead of 
“journal”). “Intrusions” are extra list intrusions that had no clear similarity to a 
list word. Intrusions were also classified as either animate (e.g., “frog”) or 
inanimate (e.g. “candle”). The pattern of synonyms was the same as the 
pattern of recall performance. The opposite pattern was found for extra list 


























































































































































































































   


















































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   


































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




















































































































   
   
   
   


























































































   







































































































































   

































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






























































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
























































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   











































































   
















































































































































































   
   
   
   
   




































































































































   
   












































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
























































































































































































































Average Number of Intrusions Per Subject in Experiment 2 
_____________________________________________ 
 Synonyms Intrusions 
_____________________________________________ 
Animate 0.35 0.35 
Inanimate 0.32 0.23 
_____________________________________________ 
Note. All intrusions were inanimate words. “Animate” and “Inanimate” here 
designate the image condition (whether subjects were instructed to create 
animate images or not). The pattern of synonyms was the same as the pattern 
of recall performance. Subjects in the Animate condition intruded more than did 





Bizarreness and Image Ratings for Experiments 2-4 
____________________________________________________________________ 
   Animate Image Inanimate Image 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Experiment 2 
 Bizarreness 3.28 (0.05) 2.63 (0.09) 
 Imagery 2.88 (0.10) 3.62 (0.07) 
Experiment 3 
 Bizarreness 3.83 (0.12) 2.89 (0.06) 
 Imagery 2.57 (.14) 3.76 (0.08) 
Experiment 4 
 Bizarreness   
  Animate Word 3.23 (0.07) 3.03 (0.09) 
      Inanimate  
     Word 3.56 (0.14) 3.30 (0.10) 
 Imagery   
  Animate Word 3.33 (0.13) 3.30 (0.15) 
      Inanimate  
     Word 2.96 (0.15) 3.08 (0.14) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Bizarreness ratings were made by independent raters on a scale from of 
1-5 where 1 was very normal and 5 was very bizarre.  Imagery ratings were 
made on a scale from 1-5 where 1 was very difficult to image and 5 was very 





Average Number of Intrusions Per Subject in Experiment 4 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 Synonyms 
 Animate Words Inanimate Words 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Animate Images 0.11 0.06 
Inanimate Images 0.07 0.04 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 Intrusions 
 Animates Inanimates 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Word Intrusions 0.30 0.25 
Image Intrusions 0.06 0.55 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Note. The pattern of synonyms was the same as the pattern of recall 
performance. Extra list intrusions were also classified as word 
intrusions that had no similarity to the to-be-remembered list and  
image intrusions which were intrusions of images that were  
associated with the to-be-remembered words. The most common  
intrusion of this sort were inanimate images (e.g., recalling  







Figure 1. Recall performance in Experiment 1. Animate words were recalled 
more than inanimate words. Subjects in the method of loci condition recalled 
more than did subjects in the pleasantness ratings condition. Error bars are 
standard error of the mean. 


























Figure 2. Recall performance in Experiment 2. There was no clear benefit for 
processing words as animates over processing words as inanimates.  Error 


























Figure 3. Recall performance in Experiment 3. Words associated with animate 
images were recalled more than words associated with inanimate images.  
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Figure 5. Recall performance in Experiment 4. Animate words and words 
associated with animate images were recalled more than inanimate words and 
words associated with inanimate images.  Error bars are standard error of the 
mean. 










































  Animate Inanimate 
Familiarity 510 (67) 516 (38) 
Imagery 590 (37) 580 (28) 
KF-Freq 35.1 (48) 16.5 (16) 
No.Letters 5.27 (1.6) 5.13 (1.3) 
Meaning-C 452 (58) 435 (31) 
Concreteness 590 (36) 594 (16) 
Category 
Size 21.7 (6.1) 22.1 (5.8) 
Typicality .224 (.21) .235 (.17) 
AoA 277 (97) 288 (99) 








































Words Animate Image Inanimate image 
book toast trying to get a tan changing colors 
bottle toy dancing to music falling from above 
candy coin standing guard made of wood 
car nail crying because she is lonely covered in dirt 
chair piano doing push ups shiny and new 
cigar ship flirtatiously batting her eyes faded from the sun 
diamond arrow plugging his nose wrapped in green paper 
dress jelly laughing hysterically old and molding 
flag hammer running in circles glowing in the dark 
fork bowl playing tennis hot pink and fuzzy 
gold dollar has the flu rotten and decaying 
pipe coffee sticking his tongue out covered in dust 
rock star humming a song painted in blood 
ticket pencil praying on his knees melting in a puddle 







Word Animate Image Inanimate Image 
baby nickel running in circles carved out of wood 
bee stove wants to eat dinner framed oil painting 
goat violin singing a song made of silver 
owl doll is in love forged of metal 
wolf pearl flirtatiously batting her eyes  limited edition playset 
duck pencil is writing a novel chiseled of stone 
father kite trying to escape made of chocolate 
trout drum dancing to music made of plastic 
turtle whistle standing guard folded out of paper 
minister rake crawling towards me sketched in pencil 
python hat wants to go outside a keychain 
engineer tent shaking because he is cold a sculpture 
judge slipper has a goofy grin made of cheese 





Instructions used in the experiments 
Experiment 1 
In this task you will learn how to memorize a list of 30 words. To do this, 
you will imagine walking through a house – perhaps your childhood home – 
and placing each item in a different location. You’ll place the items along a 
familiar path so that later you will be able to mentally retrace your steps and 
“pick up” the items you originally placed there. Some locations could be your 
driveway, front door, a chair in the living room, and so on. You may place a few 
items in the same room, but try your best to create a path. 
Try to create a rich image of each word. For example, you might see the 
word PEACH. You would imagine placing the PEACH on the driveway of your 
house. To create a rich image of the PEACH, you might imagine that the 
PEACH is so large that it is blocking you from the driveway. 
Next you might see the word BALL. You would want to imagine placing 
the BALL in the next location along the path through your house such as the 
hallway. You might then imagine that the BALL is painted in blood. Imagine 
that the blood is dripping from the BALL and onto the hallway floor. 
You will see the word in capital letters and two boxes. Your job is to type 
the location in the box labeled “location” and briefly describe the image in the 
box labeled “image”. For example, if you saw “PEACH”, you would type: 
 
Location: front door step 





Instructions in Experiment 2 were the same as Experiment 1 with the exception 
that the examples included animate examples for the animate conditions. The 
italics are added to show the differences in the animate compared to the 
inanimate examples. Subjects did not see italics. 
 
Animate condition:  
To create a rich image of the PEACH, you might imagine that the 
PEACH is angrily trying to block you from the driveway. When imagining the 
objects, imagine that they are alive. 
Next you might see the word BALL. You would want to imagine placing 
the BALL in the next location along the path through your house such as the 
front door. You might then imagine that the BALL is painting himself with blood. 
Imagine that the blood is dripping from the BALL and on the front door. 
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Experiment 3 & 4 
In this task you will learn how to memorize a list of 30 words. To do this, 
you will create an image of each word you see. Next you will imagine walking 
through a house – perhaps your childhood home – and placing each word in a 
different location along a path through the house. You’ll place the images of the 
words along a familiar path so that later you will be able to mentally retrace 
your steps and “pick up” the items you originally placed there. You will be 
asked to type each location you choose. Don’t worry if the items do not 
naturally belong in the location on your path. The goal is to place the items 
along a path and NOT to put items where you might typically find them. Next 
you will see an example of locations along a path.  
For example, the path through your house might start on the driveway. 
The first word would go on the driveway. After your driveway, you might 
imagine walking up to your front door. The second item would go by the front 
door. From there you might walk through the front door to a chair in the living 
room. Therefore, your first three locations would be (1) your driveway, (2) front 
door, (3) a chair in the living room, and so on. To really remember the words, 
you will want to create a mental picture of the item interacting with the location. 
(You will see an example soon.) You may place a few items in the same room 
(for example, the kitchen table, the kitchen sink or the fridge), but try your best 
to create a path. 
In addition to seeing a word, you will see a description of the word and a 
box to type the location. For example, you might see the word PEACH. The 
PEACH is described as being very large. Your job is to imagine the large 
PEACH at your first location of your path, such as the driveway.  
When you write your location, describe the location and how your image 
is interacting with your location. For this example you would want to type: 
 
Location: The peach is so large that it is blocking me from 




Recall Instructions (all Experiments) 
Now we would like to see if you remember the words you saw. To 
remember the words, imagine yourself walking through the locations in your 
house and remembering the words you placed there. 
We would like you to recall only the names of the objects you saw. For 
example, if you imaged a PEACH blocking the front door step, you will ONLY 
write “peach”. You will NOT write anything else for this word.  
Please do not cheat or open other tabs or browsers during the 
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